POLITICS AUGUST 8, 2009
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Friday marked the one-year anniversary of the beginning of the Russian-Georgian War. Last summer, battles were fought, lives were lost, and land was destroyed. Yet one year out, what is most striking is how little the politics related to the war seem to have changed and how many questions surrounding the conflict remain unanswered.
Let’s go back in time to early last August. In Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili was under attack from a hostile opposition that often took to the streets, accusing him of “hoarding and abusing power,” according to The New York Times. But he looked likely to stay in power until the end of his term. In Russia, Dmitri Medvedev had recently ascended to the presidency, sparking speculation about who was really in charge--Medvedev or his predecessor, Vladimir Putin. Russian-Georgian relations were frosty, and rumors flew that conflict could break out at any time. Russian-U.S. relations were also relatively chilly, with points of conflict including U.S. plans for a missile defense system in Central Europe and the question of NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine, but the two nations were cooperating on some issues of common interest, such as containing terrorist threats.
While much about what triggered the war remains in dispute, late in the evening of August 7, Georgian forces entered South Ossetia, one of two breakaway Georgian republics. The following day, Russia responded by ordering troops into South Ossetia and, eventually, Georgia proper. After five days of fighting, the sides agreed to a truce, brokered by the French. However, Russian troops remained in and around South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the other breakaway republic.
Fast forward to early August 2009. Despite the war (or maybe because of it), Saakashvili is still in power. He continues to face frequent calls for his resignation but will probably survive until the end of his term. We are no closer than we were a year ago to understanding where power really lies between Putin and Medvedev, despite claims that the war demonstrated that Putin pulls all the strings. Russian-Georgian relations are extremely tense, with rumors surfacing in recent days of new between Georgia and its breakaway republics. (Tensions have apparently increased sufficiently that Obama and Medvedev spoke about the matter by phone last Tuesday.) And, while the overall tone of Russian-U.S. relations has improved somewhat since Obama took office--the issues of missile defense and new NATO members are being addressed with a bit more tact now--the two countries essentially remain what Daniel Korski, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, called “frienemies,” cooperating on some issues and conflicting on others.
So what has changed in the past year? Most seriously, the price of oil, which was skyrocketing up toward $147 per barrel at this time last summer, has only recently returned to about half that level. Not coincidentally, the Russian economy has suffered mightily from the global economic crisis. (Georgia’s economy has also suffered, both from the war and international economic developments.) Only Russia and Nicaragua have recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent. (Noticeably missing from this list is China, which one can only assume was not pleased to see Russia stoking the aspirations of separatist regions). Russian troops are still in the republics--despite complaints from Georgia about both their actions and locations, their number is fairly low--along with some EU monitors. Georgia has asked for U.S. monitors as well, but Russia has resisted the move.
In short, little related to this war has changed; despite the Russian military victory, neither side can really claim to have gained much. So what are we to make of the conflict? Four explanations for why the war occurred seem plausible. First, it may have been a “mistake” on Georgia’s part. It’s possible Saakashvili guessed wrong, thinking he could grab South Ossetia and get back under the West’s protection before Russia did anything. Second, the war may have been a “mistake” on the part of a Russia determined to remove Saakashvili from power. Perhaps Moscow underestimated what the international community’s reaction would be and/or overestimated the capabilities of the Georgian opposition to Saakashvili. Third, as I have suggested previously on this website, the war may have been an attempt by the Russians to send a costly “signal” about its concern with growing Western influence in the former Soviet republics--in particular, vis a vis Georgian or Ukrainian NATO membership. Finally, the war may have been the start of a series of aggressive moves by Russia to reclaim parts of its former empire by force, as John McCain seemed to suggest last fall.
With regard to this fourth possibility, however, nothing we’ve seen since the conclusion of the war suggests that the Russia-on-the-march explanation is remotely likely. Moreover, forthcoming research in the journal Post-Soviet Affairs by University of Michigan professor William Zimmerman suggests that Russian foreign policy elites' conception of Russia’s appropriate sphere of influence is sensitive to the price of oil. Put another way, if Russia restrained itself from going all the way to Tbilisi last summer with oil at $147 per barrel, it seems unlikely we’ll see Russian troops in Ukraine anytime soon.
The other three explanations for the war all seem potentially credible, but we currently lack the evidence to distinguish among them. There is an international fact-finding report under the direction of a Swiss diplomat due out in September; perhaps we will learn more then.
And what comes next for Russian-Georgian relations depends largely on which explanation for the war turns out to be right. For instance, the status quo seems likely to persist if the war was a mistake on Georgia’s part--even Saakashvili is unlikely to repeat that blunder--or if the war was a signal that Moscow believes the West has heard. (Which, perhaps, it has. See, for example, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s somber comments about the possibility of Georgia joining NATO.) This could also be the outcome if the war was a first step in renewed Russian aggression. But, even if that doubtful situation is the case, Russia has been sufficiently weakened by the economic crisis that it would have put such plans on hold.
More troubling is the possibility that we could witness a second Russian-Georgian War. Although a less likely outcome, this could follow if last year's war was a failed attempt on Russia’s part to remove Saakashvili from power and it's still itching to get the job done, or if it was a signal that Moscow does not believe the West has yet heard. (We still don’t know what the Russians have made of Obama’s comments in Moscow last month about states like Georgia having a right to their own foreign policies.) And, while theoretically a gradual improvement in Russian-Georgian relations is always a possibility, as long as South Ossetia and Abkhazia remain out of Georgia's sovereign control, this is highly unlikely.
Perhaps it should not be surprising, though, that a war no one really seems to have won would yield so few definitive legacies.
Joshua A. Tucker is Associate Professor of Politics at New York University, a National Security Fellow at the Truman National Security Project, and a co-author of the political science and policy blog The Monkey Cage.
By Joshua A. Tucker
8 comments
If Russian attempts to influence the countries that it borders are "renewed Russian aggression", then how would you call US attempts to influence the countries that Russia borders?
- Chris
August 8, 2009 at 2:21am
It is about pipelines and ports and, most of all, the Swiss Bank accounts of the Russian leadership. At $147/bbl the Georgia issue is a lot more relevant to the Kremlin kleprocrats than at $70/bbl. Too many analysts try to view Russia through a sphere of influence lens when really it should be looked at more like the old Zaire.
- Guydreaux
August 8, 2009 at 9:50am
Very good question, Chris (comment #1). ......Guydreaux, your comment reminds me of tep. I miss him on threads like this, though I don't always agree with him.. .......Personally, I think Saakashvili, the Georgian leader miscalculated big time. I suspect he got (or he thought he got) a wink and a nod from Dick Cheney. Well, we live and learn, and I'd bet Saakashvili would never do such gamble again.
- scrubby
August 8, 2009 at 11:07pm
Chris, I hope you can understand the difference between providing economic aid to a democratically-elected government and invading a country and threatening to remove that democratically-elected government from power. Hint - one is a lot more like "aggression."
- Josh
August 9, 2009 at 10:21pm
I'm still puzzled. It is inconceivable that Saak, the CIA, Cheney, and everybody else involved didn't know that the Russians had retained the strike force from provocative exercises run in North Ossetia in July, and that they were in fact sitting outside the tunnel to South O. with their motors idling. It's equally inconceivable that any of these people were sufficiently delusional to imagine that Georgian forces could deal with them, or that we would do any more to help than we did, which is to say some loose talk. The only story I've heard that makes sense is that Saak secretly sold out to the Russians, and gave them an opportunity to demonstrate their power and our impotence in the Near Abroad.
- Robert Powell
August 10, 2009 at 3:42pm
My bet on the reason for the war is a combination of reasons 3 and 1. The Bush administration was really pushing to get NATO right up to the Russian border and there was a lot of talk of getting anti-missile missiles placed next to Russia, both of which clearly made the Russians quite twitchy. But I always suspected that the same pressures made Saakashvili overconfident about potential western support if he took quick action against the breakaway republics. So he did just that. His overconfidence both in the capabilities of his own troops and in the support he would get if the Russians sent troops in to counter him caused him to pull such a bone-headed move. The new Russian leadership saw an opportunity to give Saakashvili a real bloody nose and maybe unseat him, and also to give a message to the west that they were not the toothless tigers that the Bush administration and many in Western Europe seemed to think they were. It was clearly a quick decision, and who knows what the internal decision process inside Russia looked like then. But if that was the reasoning, they seem to have gotten much of what they wanted. Saakashvili has quieted down and is apparently quite chastened. The Bush administration is gone, and much of the combative and insulting noise out of Washington has disappeared. If that was the way it came down, I'd say Russia came out the net winner since Saakashvili was chastened (but survived,) and NATO has settled back to more reachable goals. The change in American administrations was in no significant way that I could determine effected by the Georgian War. But Russia did put the world on notice that the tough days after the break up of the USSR are over and the Russia is no one's patsy any more.
- Rick B
August 11, 2009 at 12:12am
Live in southern Ukraine (Crimea) so I was pretty close to the conflict. Even here we don't really understand all that happened but it would appear that Saakashvili let his ego get the best of him and he decided to reclaim some lost territory. He may have gotten wrong impression about US (maybe Cheney) and Euro support but it was his ego that got him in trouble. As for Russian response, they have a history of "blitzkrieg" military action so what was done in South O is not really a surprise. There has been a long-standing political conflict between Georgia and Russia which I'm sure they wanted to make a strong statement about. They also wanted to send something to the West about the limits of their patience for NATO. Russians are basically paranoid about being invaded (they have a long, long history of this) and seeing NATO on their southern flank was just too much to bear. If you look at a map of Russia, they see America and NATO on all sides. So there was certainly a message sent about not going too far. And just an aside ... much of the Russian government is about protecting leader's economic interests. Putin and his oligarch friends control the country and they didn't like the idea of Europe becoming less dependent on Russian gas. Driving to within a few miles of that pipeline was no mistake ... just wanted to let Europe know they could take it at any time. That's why new Euro pipeline is much further south. And Putin is very much in control of Russia. Medvedev may be president but he answers to Putin. When his term is up (2012), Putin will run for new, 6 year term and should win with massive majority. Also, Putin is rumored to be owner of 24% of Gasprom meaning he is one of the richest men in the world. You won't confirm that anywhere but 2 of richest oligarchs in Russia are KGB friends of Putin and are watching out for his interests as well as theirs.
- C. Curtis Dillon
August 16, 2009 at 8:35am
There's a problem with the phrase "neither side has gained much form the Russian Georgian war" in that it totally ignores the main benefactors of the conflict: Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The people who live in those pseudo-autonomous states have been the target of nationalist rhetoric by both Saakashvili and his predecessor. That the executives of Georgia have shelled these places in the past is not even in contention. That these regions have not been a part of Georgia historically is a fact glossed over by many a foreign policy "analyst" (they were given to the Georgian SSR by their native son, Stalin, in the USSR times). For South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the ideal situation is autonomy. I find it interesting why no one notes that these provinces have not been annexed by Russia, despite the obvious possibility that they could have been. If it is Russia that is belligerent, then how come South Ossetia and Abkhazia are still independent? I think this is a key fact that buttresses the "Georgia as aggressor" interpretation. Oh well. In the end, the only places anyone seems to care about are Russia and Georgia, and the entire reasons for the war, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, are completely ignored. They are the reason for the war, and their current status could only be improved by full autonomy.
- Pope
August 16, 2009 at 1:48pm