PLANK JUNE 7, 2012
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Speaking Thursday before the U.N. General Assembly, just one day after the latest massacre of civilians by government-affiliated forces, Kofi Annan warned that the crisis in Syria was on a disastrous course. “If things do not change, the future is likely to be one of brutal repression, massacres, sectarian violence and even all-out civil war,” he said. “All Syrians will lose.”
Annan, of course, is not the first to evoke the term “civil war” in reference to the crisis in Syria, which has already resulted in more than 10,000 dead and 50,000 missing. The term has become a favorite of opponents of intervention in Syria, who use it to conjure up the image of a human swamp of chaos, destruction and mayhem that is bloodier than what Syria has suffered over the past sixteen months, less tractable to resolution, and violently inhospitable to outsiders. The unspoken assumption is that while such a scenario may be horrible for Syrian civilians, it would not rise to the level of an international crisis—at least not one that would have much impact on the United States.
But if commentators have mostly been justified in raising the specter of civil war, they have mostly been wrong in assessing its consequences. If Syria descends into the chaos of all-out civil war, it’s not only Syrians who will lose out, as Annan suggests. Very clear American interests are also at stake.
Consider the many plausible scenarios that could yet transpire. They include:
Syrian army units responsible for the control of the regime's substantial chemical and biological weapons stocks leave their posts, either through defection, mutiny, attack from insurgents or orders from superiors to fight elsewhere, and these weapons of mass destruction go rogue.
Syria lashes out at Turkey's hosting of anti-Assad rebels by offering aid and comfort to a rejuvenated PKK insurgency against Ankara, reigniting a hellish Kurdish terrorist campaign that has claimed more than 30,000 Turkish lives over the past 30 years.
Syria pushes hundreds of thousands of hapless Palestinians still living in government-controlled refugee camps over the Jordanian, Lebanese and even Israeli borders as a way to regionalize the conflict and undermine the stability of neighboring states.
Syrian soldiers, Alawi thugs and their Hizbollah allies take their anti-Sunni crusade to the Sunnis of Lebanon, reigniting a fifteen-year conflict that sucked regional proxies—and U.S. marines—into its vortex.
Thousands of jihadists descend on Syria to fight the apostate Alawite regime, transforming this large Eastern Mediterranean country into the global nexus of violent Islamist terrorists.
None of this is fantasy. The threat of loose chemical and biological weapons tops the agenda of American and Israeli military planners. In late May, the PKK took responsibility for a suicide bombing attack by a cell that crossed the Syrian border and killed a Turkish policeman and wounded 18 others. A senior Jordanian intelligence official alerted me recently to his abiding fear of Assad using Palestinian refugees as political pawns. Already two Lebanese have been killed and many wounded by Syrian troops shooting across the border or hunting down escaping refugees on Lebanese territory. And although only a few hundred al-Qaeda-type militants have joined the Syrian opposition movement so far, the jihadization of the Syrian uprising has been on everyone's mind for more than a year.
With the passage of time, each of these scenarios—and others—have become more likely and the occurrence of any makes more likely the occurrence of others. To make matters worse, the current U.S. strategy—incremental tightening of sanctions, provision of non-lethal goods to the unarmed opposition, ad hoc supply of weaponry by cut-outs to certain armed rebel units, no direct involvement by outside armed forces either in protecting Syrian civilians or degrading Syrian regime assets—stands a good chance of triggering precisely the worst possible outcomes. This "half pregnant" strategy projects the oozy aura of American commitment without the force to make it real; at the same time, it signals to regime loyalists that they need to take extraordinary measures to counter the possibility of greater intervention. The likely result will be that the Syrian regime begins to expand the conflict to ward off an intervention that they may fear is coming while increasing numbers of jihadists who flock to wage the fight that other outsiders refuse to wage.
For Washington, the potential fallout of these scenarios is truly frightening. Chemical or biological weapons in the hands of Alawite vigilantes, Islamist terrorists or criminal gangs. Full-scale fighting along Syria's borders. The release of pent-up ethnic and religious hatreds in Lebanon or Jordan. A renewal, after forty quiet years, of shooting between Syria and Israel. Military victory for what might eventually become the jihadist-dominated rebels leading to the establishment of Taliban-style rule in Damascus and the possible creation of a breakaway Alawite canton in the mountains of Latakia. Throw in weakness and division among western allies, a possible face-off with muscle-flexing Russia, and the wild card of how Iran may exploit the Syria crisis to press ahead with its own regional ambitions—and its nuclear program—and this is a witch's brew for U.S. interests that would consume the energies of the president and could put any strategic pivot to Asia on hold for a decade.
Preventing these calamitous outcomes should be a high priority. But it is reasonable to ask whether prevention—in the form of outside intervention—will itself trigger some of these scenarios. Might it be better to let the current fighting take its course and not stir up the hornet's nest even more?
The answer is no. Left to its own, the Syrian rebellion may eventually succeed in bringing down the Assad regime, but the key to preventing these negative outcomes is speeding up the pace of change. A slow, grinding conflict in which the regime continues its merciless but ultimately futile whack-a-mole strategy is the most likely backdrop for these nightmare scenarios. In contrast, swift and decisive action to hasten Assad's departure is the best way to immunize against this set of terrifying outcomes. While Assad may unleash some of his fury in the face of assertive international action, chances are more likely that a clear display of resolve in support of the opposition is the key ingredient to fracturing his surprisingly resilient governing coalition and bringing the regime tumbling down.
Such resolve could include a mix of cyberwarfare, to interfere with Syrian government communications efforts; unmanned drones, to target key installations and weapons depots; air power, to establish and defend safe zones; and a manned element based in neighboring states, to execute a train and equip mission to support rebel forces. At the same time, it is essential that the United States, teamed with Arab, Turkish and other allies, inject urgency and energy into the task of upgrading the cohesion and message of the Syrian political opposition, so that there is a clear answer to the important question of what comes in the wake of Assad's demise.
Even with all-out effort, a dose of realism is warranted. Syria is going to be a mess for years to come; a peaceful, inclusive, representative Syria anytime soon—one hesitates even to use the word "democratic"—is a fantasy. In a post-Assad world, inter-ethnic reconciliation will be an uphill battle and the inclusion of some Islamists in a successor government is—regrettably, in my view—a necessary fact of Syrian life. Still, policymaking is often accepting bad outcomes when the alternatives are worse, especially when the worse outcomes have the potential to wreak havoc on American interests.
Beyond the humanitarian disaster that Syria has become, the strategic damage that could result from the nightmare scenarios that could transpire in Syria should concentrate the minds of U.S. strategists. If it takes American-led intervention to prevent them, then that is where discussion of U.S. policy should begin. Time is not an ally.
Robert Satloff is the executive director of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
15 comments
Satloff suggests two options are available: continuing modest and indirect aid, and more vigorous efforts, suggesting, perhaps with good reason, that the latter will produce preferable results. But isn't there a third option: stopping aid to the opposition, and potentially allowing the gov't crackdown to succeed in restoring order and something like the status quo? What are the consequences, humanitarian, ideological, and regarding US interests, in that scenario?
- Curran1
June 7, 2012 at 8:00pm
Curran, that is not an option. It would just radicalize the opposition who would turn to Salafists and Wahabists willing to blow themselves up in Damascus and other cities for years to come. The Alawites are a small minority and remain in power only by elements of the wealthy business class; Sunni, Shia, Christian, Druze, etc. Random and perpetual suicide bombers targeting them will wear them down and out. I am not as pessimistic long term as the author, I would be if I were Syrian but I don't see any of these scenarios playing out. What I see happening is eventually Assad and his family (extended) will be sacrificed (as in Egypt) and a business/military oligarchy will take its place. Hell, in Libya most of the present regime were elements of the last one, the trick for the coming junta will be timing.
- blackton
June 7, 2012 at 11:22pm
good response, blackton.
- arnon1
June 8, 2012 at 12:09am
Still not certain how we can be so sure about the outcome of any of these scenarios. One lesson I take away from the Iraq war is that the reality is more complicated and unpredictable than the theory, in interventions, particularly when it regards a society we do not fully understand. Not that this militates for any particular option. Just saying: does anyone really know what the hell will result from any particular path of action, at this point? Didn't many observers expect Assad already to be gone, at this point? Blackton, I hope you're right, but so far the Assad regime seems to have a pretty good hold on the hundreds of thousands strong Syrian military, the ranks of which, I understand, are not majority Alawite.
- Curran1
June 8, 2012 at 2:19am
About 12% of the Syrian population is Alawi (Shia), 74% Sunni, 10% Christian, and 3% Druze. Most (70%) of the 200,000 career soldiers in the Syrian armed forces are Alawi, but the vast majority of about 300,000 conscripts are Sunni (military service is mandatory). The elite troops (such as the Republican Guard) are exclusively Alawi. The rebels are almost exclusively Sunni. The percentages tell the story: this is a civil war that Assad cannot win. He cannot win if the war is limited to Syrians. But if interventionists prevail and come to the aid of the Sunni rebels, neighboring Shia will come to the aid of their Shia (Alawi) brothers, and that would include both Iran and our "friends" in Iraq. If that occurs, then the overwhelming population advantage of Syrian Sunnis will be lost, and Satloff will have the "nightmare scenario" he appears to prefer.
- rayward
June 8, 2012 at 7:19am
Some of Satloff's worst-case scenaria are more realistic than others, but he misses what might be the likeliest scenario -- Assad's regime encouraging Hezbollah to initiate another confrontation with Israel, that results in another Israeli invasion of Lebanon. That might give his regime the opportunity to rally support in Syria for a new stand-off with Israel and portray the Syrian resistance as tools of the Zionists who are bent on the subjugation of Lebanon and Syria and the extension of Jewish rule to the Euphrates (a popular theme in anti-Semitic conspiracies in the Islamic world). The opposition may have to stand down at that point, which could lead to its fracturing and allow the Assad family to reassert control over the whole country. The strategy is obviously risky, as there is no guarantee that the next Israeli invasion of Lebanon would be as poorly executed as the last one, and Hezbollah's standing in Lebanon has eroded as a result of its backing of Assad against the Syrian revolution. But at this point, it may be a gamble that Assad would be willing to take if the internal pillars of his regime start to actively crumble. If nothing else, it would get the UN out of Damascus and back to mediating Israeli intervention in Lebanon, which is something the UN probably prefers anyway. Also, scenarios in which fighting spills over other countries' borders (especially the borders of US allies like Turkey or Jordan) would greatly increase the chances of a Western military intervention in Syria that would topple Assad's regime (or weaken it so much that the revolutionaries would triumph). A large-scale intervention by the Turkish Army to occupy Syrian border areas would probably be interpreted by Syrian Sunnis as a rescue by their fellow Sunni Turks and may lead to mass desertions from Assad's army. Sending masses of Palestianian refugees to Jordan or Lebanon may allow Western powers to act militarily to set up "safe zones" within Syria's borders so the refugees could return to Syria, with the safe zones then becoming de facto havens for Syrian revolutionaries. Sending masses of Palestinians into the Golan probably won't work, however, as the Israelis would either fire on marchers or, if there is a large-scale refugee flood, house them in camps on the Golan.
- wildboy
June 8, 2012 at 10:13am
How would Satloff ensure that the "rebel forces" trained by the "manned element based in neighbouring states" were not made up of precisely the sort of radicals he fears might bring the country to the brink of civil war? Would he have the US and allies set up an elaborate vetting process to weed this sort of terrorist element out? This sounds impractical to me. The post-Libya Mali calamity has proven that a small number of dedicated fighters, armed by a foreign power, can make the difference between stalemate and defeat for a conventional army. Although outnumbered by Touareg nationalists, Ansar Dine, an offshoot of Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb with ties to Boko Haram, has already started to implement their fanatical version of Shari'a law in and around Timbuktu. Syria's Sunni radicals are far larger in number and benefit from the sympathy of a non- negligible section of the country’s Sunni population and Syrians living abroad. They have announced their determination to cleanse the country of its Shi'a apostates. One intervention option not mentioned by Satloff (probably because of its implausibility) is worth pondering: a large Turkish troop deployment, not just in the border regions as wildboy envisaged but all the way down to the capital. With diplomatic support from the Sunni Arab states and logistical backing from the US, the Turks could reign in the Sunni radicals (after all, Erdogan is wildly popular among Sunnis and belongs to same political family as many of the radical groups) whilst acting a buffer between Sunnis and Shi'a. Iran would likely be hugely reluctant to start a fight with a Turkish occupation force.
- Singlpayer
June 8, 2012 at 10:52am
As an irreligious dubiously ethical nihilist, I once again contemplate that perhaps the most religious area of the world (historically and currently) is arguably the most conflict-ridden. Perhaps religion should be banned, at least in the Middle East. (Hard on Israel, I realize, but there you go; if one has to go, then all have to go. After all people such as Stalin and Mao banned religion and created peaceful Utopian societies, which reached their apogee in North Korea. Send Kim the youngest to Syria and the Middle East to bring peace!
- skahn
June 8, 2012 at 11:13am
"The percentages tell the story: this is a civil war that Assad cannot win. He cannot win if the war is limited to Syrians. But if interventionists prevail and come to the aid of the Sunni rebels, neighboring Shia will come to the aid of their Shia (Alawi) brothers, and that would include both Iran and our "friends" in Iraq. If that occurs, then the overwhelming population advantage of Syrian Sunnis will be lost, and Satloff will have the "nightmare scenario" he appears to prefer." How do you know, Rayward, what Satloff "prefers?" And how do you know that "fellow Shias" will come to the aid of Alawites?
- arnon1
June 8, 2012 at 12:07pm
wildboy "Some of Satloff's worst-case scenaria are more realistic than others, but he misses what might be the likeliest scenario -- Assad's regime encouraging Hezbollah to initiate another confrontation with Israel, that results in another Israeli invasion of Lebanon." That's one scenario, but it's a scenario that one would have thought would have happened by now. Still it's the mid-East and anything can happen.
- arnon1
June 8, 2012 at 12:10pm
Arnon, maybe it hasn't happened because Assad has not been desperate enough to try it. It is a pretty desperate gambit, after all.
- wildboy
June 8, 2012 at 12:15pm
This article by a Turkish analyst alleges that one of the causes of Turkish sluggishness is the presence of a number of die-hard pro-Iran advisors in Erdogan's inner circle. If this is true the Turkish leadership is unlikely to take on even a backseat role in Satloff's diplomatic and military escalation against the Assad regime. And without Turkey's blessing, manpower and intelligence any intervention is doomed to fail. http://www.alarabiya.net/views/2012/04/29/211023.html For all its aggressive rhetoric and bluster, Turkey is a surprisingly timorous would-be Middle East hegemon. Just heard an Middle East "expert" on French Radio say that all this mess could be cleared up if only Israel returned the Golan to its legal owner! Some people never learn...
- Singlpayer
June 8, 2012 at 12:34pm
Rather than waste time speculating about this or that "nightmare scenario", how about taking a look at the reports from Damascus, including those by Julien Barnes-Dacey in Foreign Policy. She reports from the scene that Sunni Assad loyalists (it's the Sunni Assad loyalists on which Assad's survival depends) have made a marked shift in the past few weeks. Assad's Sunni support is crumbling, and that crumbling is gaining momentum, leading to the current strike by merchants in Damascus. Let the Syrians resolve this struggle. They will. If left alone by the interventionists.
- rayward
June 8, 2012 at 2:40pm
"Arnon, maybe it hasn't happened because Assad has not been desperate enough to try it. It is a pretty desperate gambit, after all." Could be. Could also be that Assad knows that if he starts a war between his clients in Lebanon and Israel that he would be the likely loser,
- arnon1
June 8, 2012 at 7:06pm
TNR is obsessed with Syria. No other news media member is. Syria is so irrelevant that is ignored by all. A failure to communicate.
- JAIMECHUCH
June 10, 2012 at 8:31am