PLANK JANUARY 10, 2013
-
Read Later
READ LATERAvailable only to subscribers. SUBSCRIBE TODAY
-
Listen
ARTICLE AUDIO
- Font Size
When Barack Obama nominated former Senator Chuck Hagel to be Secretary of Defense, I assume that he knew what he was getting into. The debate over Hagel’s nomination won’t be about whether he is qualified to run the Pentagon and to negotiate budgets with Congress, but about Hagel’s views on Israel and Iran. Initially, some of Hagel’s critics charged that he was an anti-Semite. But these charges rightfully met with derision. Hagel’s principal critics in the Senate have adopted a different line: this his views are “out of the mainstream.”
“Quite frankly,” Republican Senator Lindsey Graham says, “Chuck Hagel is out of the mainstream on most issues regarding foreign policy.” Citing Hagel’s views on Iran, Texas Republican Senator John Cornyn said he wouldn’t vote for him “because he’s certainly outside of the national security mainstream.” William Kristol’s Emergency Committee on Israel says Hagel’s views place him “well outside the American mainstream.” But in Washington, one politician’s mainstream is another politician’s creek. Hagel represents a distinct foreign policy that has prominent adherents in Washington’s foreign policy community and that can’t be dismissed as marginal or fringe by a few rightwing Republicans.
Hagel came by his views through reading—he is largely self-educated—and through reflection on his own experience in Vietnam. But by the onset of the Iraq War in 2003, he had arrived at similar conclusions to a group of former foreign policy officials that included Brent Scowcroft, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Lee Hamilton, and Thomas Pickering. He has worked with them on reports and commissions, and all of them have endorsed his nomination. And they are just the most prominent names. A large, similarly inclined and well-attended discussion group, begun in the wake of the Iraq war by Washingtonians John Henry and C. Boyden Gray and composed partly of former officials, has been meeting for a decade.
These foreign policy officials are sometimes described as “realists.” And Hagel has described his own views as “principled realism.” But their kind of realism is really different from the academic realism of Kenneth Waltz, which focuses only on power relations between states, or even the Cold War realism of Henry Kissinger or Jeane Kirkpatrick, which condoned anti-communist autocracies. Hagel and the ex-officials understand realism to mean a “realistic”—as opposed to “reckless”—foreign policy. They don’t reject the idea that the world would be better if dictatorships became democracies, but they are very cautious about how the United States could bring that about.
Hagel and the former officials are internationalists. They believe in alliances and in what George H.W. Bush and Scowcroft called creating a “new world order”—a phrase that Hagel himself still uses. While many of the neo-conservatives concluded that after the Cold War, the world had become unipolar, with the United States at the top and able to impose its will on “rouge nations,” the realists drew a very different conclusion. They believe that the Cold War’s end had created a multipolar and potentially anarchic world that threatens to erupt in new kinds of wars and crises that require coordinated responses. They also think that the world has become what Brzezinski calls “post-imperial”— that the great powers can no longer simply impose their will upon lesser developed countries. And that particularly applies to the Middle East where resentment of Western imperialism endures.
That’s where the first application of this realism occurred. In Gulf War of 1991, the George H. W. Bush administration created a coalition to kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. The administration won Security Council backing and the support of Saudi Arabia, Syria and other Arab states. That undermined Iraq’s case that the United States was trying to impose its imperial will. The Bush administration also adopted the limited objective of ousting Iraq from Kuwait, but not invading Iraq. Scowcroft, who was Bush’s National Security Advisor, later explained that they were worried about “turning the whole Arab world against us” if they marched on Baghdad. In other words, Scowcroft and Bush understood that in a post-imperial world the United States could not unilaterally undertake regime change without suffering severe consequences.
Scowcroft made a very similar argument in August 2002 against America invading Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein. And while Hagel voted for the resolution to authorize force in October 2002, he did so on the assumption that Bush was going to give priority to creating a Gulf War-type alliance through the United Nations. "Going it alone and imposing a U.S.-led military government instead of a multinational civilian administration could turn us from liberators into occupiers, fueling resentment throughout the Arab world," he wrote. When the United States did invade, and became occupiers, Hagel joined Scowcroft in opposition.
Hagel, Scowcroft, Brzezinski and the other ex-officials have approached the question of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons in a similar manner. They would like to block Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Hagel wrote in America: Our Next Chapter: “ An Iranian nuclear breakout would have dangerous consequences in a region characterized by unresolved and long-standing conflicts, including the overriding Arab-Israeli issue, a centuries-old sectarian divide in Islam, and the absence of mechanisms and institutions to promote diplomacy and conflict resolution. This is a potential nuclear match that could ignite a Middle East bonfire.”
But Hagel has opposed the United States unilaterally imposing sanctions. And Hagel and the former officials think that if the United States tries to take out Iran’s nuclear facilities either unilaterally or in conjunction with Israel, the U.S. could lead to “problematic consequences for global and regional stability, including economic stability,” while only delaying, or even making more certain, Iran’s acquisition of a bomb. According to a report last September signed by Hagel, Scowcroft and Brzezinski, an American attack could lead to spiraling escalation and the “breakdown of hard-won global solidarity against Iran’s nuclear program, “damage to the United States global reputation” and “increased credibility for anti-American extremist groups.” Hagel, Brzezinski and Scowcroft back multilateral sanctions, but want them coupled with an American willingness to negotiate with Iran and with the promise of better relations if Iran agrees to suspend its nuclear program.
In contrast to Hagel’s critics, the former officials don’ t think that the sanctions should be coupled with the threat of war. Brzezinski sums up the case: “I don’t think it helps our negotiating position one bit to be hinting about the use of force. First of all, I think the use of force would produce catastrophic consequences that would vastly increase our problems in the region. Second, I think it just makes it easier for the regime to mobilize Iranian nationalism and create a united front against us, which enables them to dig in their heels.”
Hagel, who co-chaired Obama’s Intelligence Advisory Board, held out hope in an interview last May that diplomacy could prevent the choice whether “to attack Iran or live with a nuclear armed Iran,” and has been cagey about stating what the United States should do if Iran were to go ahead and build a weapon, but in his book he appeared to opt for deterrence over attack. Hagel, who remains a disciple of George Kennan, wrote that if diplomacy fails, the U.S. will have to follow a strategy of “containment and confrontation.”
Containment presumably means deterring Iran through the threat of nuclear retaliation. Hagel writes that “the genie of nuclear armaments is already out of the bottle, no matter what Iran does. In this imperfect world, sovereign nation-states possessing nuclear weapons capability (as opposed to stateless terrorist groups) will often respond with some degree of responsible, or at least sane, behavior. These governments, however hostile they may be toward us, have some appreciation of the horrific results of a nuclear war and the consequences they would suffer.”
That may not still be Hagel’s view. In his more recent statements, he seems to suggest that an attack against Iran is a possibility, but what seems fair to conclude is that if the United States were to conduct such an attack, he would only favor if it were done with the support of other key actors in the region. That view of American options toward Iran puts Hagel, as well as Scowcroft and Brzezinski, at odds with Graham and other neo-conservatives who want to brandish the threat of an American attack or of American support for an Israeli attack.
Hagel’s views on Israel and the Palestinians also reflect the thinking of Scowcroft, Brzezinski and many former foreign policy officials—indeed, former officials going back to the Truman era. Hagel believes that “religious and geopolitical unrest in the Middle East is the great unresolved crisis of our time” and that “at its core is the struggle between the Israelis and the Palestinians.” He doesn’t think it is the only issue in the Middle East, but that it feeds other conflicts. Hagel, Scowcroft and Brzezinski argue that the only way that the two sides can ever come together is through the United States playing the role of “honest broker of peace.”
Hagel wants the United States to put forward a two-state solution on the model of the “Clinton parameters” that Israeli and Palestinian negotiators discussed at Taba in January 2001, bordered by the 1967 Green Line (with line swaps) and with the Palestinians ceding the right to return and the Israelis unitary control of Jerusalem. To further negotiations, Hagel, Scowcroft and Brzezinski signed a report last year recommending that the United States talk to all parties, including Hamas, and should encourage reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah.
What makes their outlook distinctive is the urgency they place on resolving the conflict along the lines of two states; their refusal to accept the view that America’s special relationship with Israel entails uncritical support for the Israeli government; their willingness to talk to Hamas as well as Fatah; and their disdain for attempts by AIPAC and other groups to silence critics of current Israeli intransigence. They construe being an “honest broker” as genuinely not taking sides, but recognizing that both the Israelis and Palestinians have legitimate rights to a state. That doesn’t seem controversial, but is contrary to the stance of organizations like the Zionists of America, which oppose a two-state solution, or AIPAC, which wants the United States to put the onus on the Palestinians in negotiations.
Neither Hagel nor his critics represent something that could be described as the mainstream, but Hagel, Scowcroft, and Brzezinski certainly have as much claim to it as their critics. Does Lindsey Graham, who remains an enthusiastic backer of the Iraq War, represent the mainstream? Or other Hagel critics and unrepentent boosters of the Iraq War like the Washington Post’s or Wall Street Journal’s editorial boards? Or Kristol’s Emergency Committee, which refuses to take a position in favor of a two-state solution in Israel?
Hagel’s principled realism is not without flaws. Its caution over intervention can lead to inaction in places like Syria and Libya and to Kissingerian rationalizations about human rights violations. (Scowcroft invited some of these criticisms during the first Bush administration when he blithely justified inciting Iraq’s Shi’ites to rebellion, only to allow them to be slaughtered.) But in Washington today—where questions about the Middle East loom large Hagel's voice could play an important role preventing the United States from stumbling into still another war and in pressing an Israeli government that appears to be hurtling even farther to the right.
26 comments
Finally, an informed piece on Hagel that captures the nuances of his realism in the context of fellow travellers such as Scowcroft, Zbig and Baker. It is a relief to read something that doesn't resort to the usual glib characterisation of Hagel's war vote - that he supported the Iraq War but then subsequently became a latent operational critic. That is simplistic. Hagel's position was more nuanced than that. In many ways, he was a fiercer, earlier and more persausive critic of the whole conception of the war and the unilateral framework it was tied to than many liberals who subsequently opened their eyes, including Peter Beinart, Friedman and the Clintons. They articulated things as their thinking evolved and it became safe to do so behind the critical mass of protest. Hagel was more principled and he faced a tougher internal test from his party to do so....
- Willf
January 10, 2013 at 12:34am
Let's hope it leads to inaction in Syria, what with all the usual neo-cons beating the war drum. I suppose that Hagel is out of the neo-con mainstream. Thank god.
- roidubouloi
January 10, 2013 at 12:45am
"Hagel came by his views through reading—he is largely self-educated—and through reflection on his own experience in Vietnam. But by the onset of the Iraq War in 2003, he had arrived at similar conclusions to a group of former foreign policy officials that included Brent Scowcroft, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Lee Hamilton, and Thomas Pickering. He has worked with them on reports and commissions, and all of them have endorsed his nomination. And they are just the most prominent names. A large, similarly inclined and well-attended discussion group, begun in the wake of the Iraq war by Washingtonians John Henry and C. Boyden Gray and composed partly of former officials, has been meeting for a decade." He just happened to arrive at the same world view as Brz and company of neo-Realists. This is another one of Judis' dishonest articles.
- arnon1
January 10, 2013 at 1:26am
And while Hagel voted for the resolution to authorize force in October 2002, he did so on the assumption that Bush was going to give priority to creating a Gulf War-type alliance through the United Nations. Thanks for this, everytime I hear that "But he voted for the war" on cable tv I want to scream. It was to pressure Saddam to open up for inspectors. Personally I thought that once Bush assembled his army in Kuwait nothing was going to stop him but I understand how others thought he would be like his father, and that the invasion would be an absolute last resort, sadly though so did Saddam who also thought Bush was not going to invade. Everybody blundered into the War except GWB who just blundered the execution of it. And screw Kristol, his candidate lost. Since Libya was a great success (and it was, no more Gadhafi and his spawn) I think Hagel would appreciate that kind of campaign if it ever came up again, which I doubt, and Obama would call the shots anyhow. As to Scowcroft, was he really so wrong? Look at Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria, all nations that had or are having successful revolutions. Our only mistake was in not arming the rebels in Iraq, but they thought Saddam was whipped. Assad is getting whipped without any outside power destroying his war machine first.
- blackton
January 10, 2013 at 1:26am
arnon, yeah but what about Sen. Webb? I don't find coming to the same world view independently as others being that unusual. It might not be so with Hagel, I don't know but I certainly wouldn't cast Webb with that group though he was prescient to the war in Iraq moreso than most.
- blackton
January 10, 2013 at 1:30am
"arnon, yeah but what about Sen. Webb? I don't find coming to the same world view independently as others being that unusual. It might not be so with Hagel, I don't know but I certainly wouldn't cast Webb with that group though he was prescient to the war in Iraq moreso" I just find the idea of "coming to an independent world view" a little quaint.
- arnon1
January 10, 2013 at 3:13am
Hagel wrote (quote from the above article): "An Iranian nuclear breakout would have dangerous consequences in a region characterized by unresolved and long-standing conflicts, including the overriding Arab-Israeli issue, a centuries-old sectarian divide in Islam, and the absence of mechanisms and institutions to promote diplomacy and conflict resolution. This is a potential nuclear match that could ignite a Middle East bonfire. . . . "[R]eligious and geopolitical unrest in the Middle East is the great unresolved crisis of our time . . . [and that] at its core is the struggle between the Israelis and the Palestinians." This is the underlying difference between Hagel and his critics: while his critics view the Arab-Israeli divide as the only ethnic-religious conflict in the region, Hagel views it as one of two, the other being the sectarian divide in Islam, the latter being the source of most of the violence and American casualties in the region. GWB's advisers didn't tell GWB about the sectarian divide before the invasion of Iraq because, to them, it doesn't really exist, not separate and apart from the Arab-Israeli divide. Indeed, read accounts of the civil war in Syria, in the NYT or the WP, and rarely is the Sunni-Shia divide even mentioned, even though it's at the heart of the war. Unless and until we come to grips with the sectarian divide in the region, a strategy to address and mitigate it, the potential for regional war will exist, and it's such a war that would likely trigger the nuclear confrontation that has caused the obsession with Iran. It's the obsession with Iran and failure to deal with the sectarian divide that creates the great risk in the region.
- rayward
January 10, 2013 at 7:49am
Here's for you dhurtado: http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/111573/obama-didnt-get-rolled-the-fiscal-cliff-in-fact-he-won?page=1#comment-390364
- roidubouloi
January 10, 2013 at 7:55am
Only in the peculiar environment of America's foreign policy debate would the term realist be considered an insult. Realists dwell in the reality-based community that favors facts over cant and reason over ideology. This is true in domestic policy, as well. The overlap between non-realists and supply-siders who have tried to repeal the laws of mathematics to make dynamic scoring a reputable part of the budget process is considerable. The opponents of realism, as Karl Rove gleefully confessed, do not dwell in the reality-based community. They believe in whatever the opposite of reality is. Inevitably, a person favors the method they believe will yield superior results -- reality or non-reality.
- DC Spence
January 10, 2013 at 10:42am
I would rather know what Hagel's position is on the F-35JSF program than his foreign policy views. Really odd how everything about Hagel is about everything except Pentagon procurement programs, within which, the F35JSF is the BudgetGodzilla.
- K2K
January 10, 2013 at 10:53am
"Only in the peculiar environment of America's foreign policy debate would the term realist be considered an insult." It's no different from Neo-con, or neo-liberal in that all of these terms are imprecise and don't denote any stable referent. Realist means many things to different "realists" and it can never have a single meaning. Besides no one has a lock on "reality." Judis' "don't believe" article (which has become his own private genre) makes many unverifiable claims such as that Hagel came to his beliefs independent of anyone else including Scowcroft, Brzezinski and other people he had worked with. Mostly he claims that Hagel wasn't influenced by Brz since he knows that many readers distrust the former secretary of State..
- arnon1
January 10, 2013 at 11:19am
Oversimplification of Middle Eastern, North African and Central Asian issues we don't need. Obviously, pinning it all on the Arab/Israeli conflict is absurd, but, sectarian conflicts are also only part of the issue, though an extremely important one. Overlooked are economic issues, tribal and clan conflicts (very obvious within the Palestinian community just as an example and also Lebanon, which likewise can't be neatly or completely tagged as "sectarian conflict" - what do you call the Druze and differences between country and city people?) and of course an awakening educated class that may trend left or right, depending, and which may or may not favor women's rights and an awareness of gay people. There is also modernization, industrialization, automation - all the problems which beset the rest of the world may be more starkly obvious in the rapidly changing MENA/Central Asia. Just today, so far, 103 people have died of bombings in Pakistan - all for various causes: revolution, anti-government action, sectarianism, ethnic conflict.
- Sophia
January 10, 2013 at 2:51pm
"The overlap between non-realists and supply-siders who have tried to repeal the laws of mathematics to make dynamic scoring a reputable part of the budget process is considerable. " Perhaps (though that's what happens when you draw the line between one foreign policy view and ALL of its opponents, regardless of their very diverse beliefs), but the overlap between "realists" in the upper echelons of the US Gov't and war criminals who need to be dragged into the Hague is also considerable. It's a pity that this will probably never actually happen to Kissinger and his lackeys. "Realists" have no more a claim on "reality" than any other foreign policy camp. They just lucked into have a name that sounds like "reality." Helps pull the wool over the eyes of the misinformed. What "Realism" actually refers to is a rejection of the sorts of things that most people tend to care about in foreign relations -- ethics and morals and not helping dictators round up and gun down their peasantry just because it might benefit the United States in the short run. Hagel may be in line with these "principled realists" who say they, at least, wouldn't back the worst atrocities. He still opposed sanctions on Libya and Syria. Smells a lot like good, old-fashioned "realism" to me. And, as noted in this magazine previously, the Defense Department does play a large role in US Foreign Policy, because so much of our foreign policy these days is carried out through training and support for foreign militiaries (particularly around East and Southeast Asia).
- zuludown
January 10, 2013 at 3:01pm
Sophia -- You make an excellent point. But Rayward is very committed to a particular Orientalist worldview -- It's just all about religion to "those people," and if you understand their hokey religion, you'll understand them, because they're just so backwards and stupid. OF COURSE the Palestinians and Syrians and Egyptians and Iranians might have motivations that go beyond ancient rivalries and tribalism, but why think about those reasons when it's just much easier to fold it all into Sunni/Shia, Arab/Jew, East/West? It also conveniently absolves the rest of the world of any responsibility for their problems.
- zuludown
January 10, 2013 at 3:07pm
zuludown, I think there is an increasing interdependence in the world created/enabled/enhanced by modern communications systems in particular, but the implications of that are difficult to pin down (think of the way in which, only a couple of years ago, we used to think of the internet as a place to be anonymous in a new, radical way, and how we think now of the internet as the thing that's aggregating all sorts of information on our private lives, personal tastes etc). So we can get a lot of real-time information these days on what's happening in, say, Aleppo -- but the Syrians can also get real-time information on grim events here like the shootings in Newtown CT. The contexts are different of course, and there is a question of scale (although not an easy one) but we can discover, for example, that there are middle-class professional people in Aleppo and they can discover that our children can die from violence too. But the issue of responsibility being the rest of the world's? I'm not so sure of that. There are many countries in the world -- most, even -- that have zero responsibility for Syria because they have had no influence at any time in history on that region, and have none today. Other countries might more obviously carry some responsibility e.g. France, the United States, Russia. Or Iran. But what if Iran is already designated as a country for whose problems "the rest of the world" is responsible. Can a nation such as Egypt, Iran, or Palestine be both victim and perpetrator? It seems to me that it's often a bit dubious to determine that "the rest of the world" is always the responsible party, and never the players themselves. In particular, it permits all errors or shortcomings to be parked at someone else's door, rather than your own.
- ironyroad
January 10, 2013 at 6:03pm
irony -- My point about "responsibility" is about more than just a sort of responsibility for having "caused" a certain set of events or something. Yes, that's an aspect of it, but it's not all of it. The issue is that, by simply breaking these complicated ideological issues into ones simply of tribe and religion -- "Syria is just about the Sunni majority vs. the Alawite ruling minority" or "Iran's foreign policy stems from the Sunni/Shia split" -- you can absolve the West of any particular moral responsibility to the people of Syria (or of Libya, or of Kosovo, or of any other region of the world). If the issues are cosmic ones -- Liberty, Freedom, Independence, Human Rights -- then countries like America (which enjoy the benefits of those cosmic issues at home and on the world stage) begin to have some moral requirements to, at the very least, not stand in the way of their advancement abroad and to not materially aid those who try to keep the peoples of those nations oppressed. But if those issues are really just fronts for these old tribal problems, then there is no responsibility. It's just another thing that those crazy arabs/persians/kurds/turks will probably never sort out, right? As far as victimhood and responsibility goes, I'm not really certain of your point. Of course the world is not broken into two competing classes of "victim" and "oppressor." A nation victimized by another can of course turn around and do the oppressing. I don't think anyone serious would really dispute that. Nor am I entirely sure of what your point is with the comment about the immediacy of information now. I doubt the Syrian people are either comforted or chastened by the revelation (hardly a revelation) that American children can be gunned down sometimes, too.
- zuludown
January 10, 2013 at 6:46pm
What exactly is the nature of our moral responsibility to the people of Syria? They have been the source of a lot of violent mischief in the world. What then is their moral responsibility to us? Is it our responsibility to depose every loathsome dictator in the world? Last time I checked, the Third World thought that was colonialism.
- roidubouloi
January 10, 2013 at 8:24pm
I think everyone (everyone not horrible, anyways) would agree that we have a moral responsibility to not aid those who violate human rights in the worst ways. On a practical level, that would mean levying sanctions on governments like those of Syria, or of Apartheid South Africa, or of Iran (and, yes, of Saudi Arabia, given its treatment of women and gays). Most would probably agree that we have a moral responsibility to at least materially aid those peoples who are fighting (literally or figuratively) for their basic human rights. That would mean arms sales or funding or intelligence, but not necessarily physical force. No, we cannot afford to topple every dictator and military junta in the world. But in cases like those of Syria, we do have a moral responsibility to intervene on behalf of the people being murdered. As Iraq and other cases have shown, that can only really be accomplished with the support of the world at large, however. Why do we have this moral responsibility? We tend to think of our political rights (most of them, anyways, though perhaps not all) as stemming from a universal moral basis -- freedom of conscience isn't something I have because the US Constitution guarantees it but because there's something important about being a human that means I ought to have that right. And, if we take those statements seriously (rather than as just a bunch of words we thought up back in the 1940s in a fit of liberal hysteria), then that means violating those rights is a crime against everything. The alternative is to consign the rest of the world to darkness -- they don't really matter, because they're not Americans with the benefit of American (or French or British or Belgian or Japanese) law. It means that there is nothing seriously wrong about bombing civilians or engaging in foreign slave labor -- it might be illegal but it's not immoral in any real sense. And as a liberal I find that proposition sickening.
- zuludown
January 11, 2013 at 12:23am
zulu, I concede that I was somewhat less than concrete in my post above -- although I thought that the problem about countries being both victims and perpetrators was pretty clear -- but while accepting your justification to call me on my vagueness, I'd also turn it around and ask you, what exactly do you mean when you say that we "should not stand in the way of their advancement [that is, if I understand correctly, of liberty, freedom, human rights etc] abroad"? In re Syria, for example, how are we standing in the way at the moment? And if we are, what are in concrete terms those "cosmic" values that we should support? Assuming that the opposition is fighting for those values in some shape or form, should we support the Syrian opposition groups with weapons? Should we try to get a handle on particular groups that are more in tune with our values in the US, rather than others? What happens if we discover that some groups have very different values to ours e.g. radical Islamist? Should we have supported the ouster of Mubarak in Egypt? If so (and we did), are the values we express better protected in Egypt now under Morsi than before? I'm not necessarily disputing the general tenor of your posts -- I agree that "realism" can be a cover name for a kind of cynical "hands off" endorsement of dicatorships that serve our interests (or ostensible interests anyway). But I am suggesting that "cosmic issues" is just as vague and open to multiple interpretation as anything I said.
- ironyroad
January 11, 2013 at 1:11am
"to not aid those who violate human rights in the worst ways. On a practical level, that would mean levying sanctions" Zulu - admittedly a sentence fragment - but I think "to not aid" and "levying sanctions" are clear different things. To not aid does *not* mean levying sanctions. Unless you consider trade, financial transactions and the like to constitute "aid". More to the point, I am not sure how levying sanctions that run contrary to international law are helpful. For example, Saudi Arabia is now a member of the WTO. Sanctions that are not consistent with USSC resolutions are likely to be found inconsistent with the WTO. How will that help advance the rule of internationally? Or, in respect of Syria, aggressive sanctions that affect our allies and trading partners, or that amount to extraterritorial imposition of US laws and values, simply inflame relations with those friend and allies. "The alternative is to consign the rest of the world to darkness" Is it? If the rest of the world does not benefit from American values imposed by American arms or American sanctions, they live in darkness? And American sanctions and Americans arms bring a world of light to those dark corners of the rest of the world? Curious view of the world, and of America. How is it different from the White Man's Burden?
- icarus-r
January 11, 2013 at 10:05am
irony -- I don't think we're standing in the way at the moment. But if we followed Hagel's line on sanctions in Libya or Syria, that would constitute standing in the way. And, as much as this discussion is about Hagel and his fitness to hold one of the government's most powerful positions, that's relatively important. As far as what concrete things we should do, I think our policies in Libya and Egypt were perfectly suited to the situations we faced there. And, yes, these values were better-protected with Mubarak's ouster than they were with him. With him and the junta in power, there was zero chance of Egypt's citizenry ever gaining basic liberal rights. The Islamists have done quite a bit to nullify a lot of the good that was done, but they're still better off, and even if a similar situation arises again, at least there was the chance of something better. As far as Syria goes, we have imposed sanctions and frozen assets. Those are, of course, in concert with sanctions that the EU has imposed. More could be done, either by helping to arm the rebel groups (more or less being done now, but it could be expanded) or by sending an international peacekeeping force. Worry about what will happen afterwards seems to me a bit overwrought. The people are being murdered right now. Yes, it would be terrible if Islamist extremists gained power in the aftermath (I would note, however, that the Jihadists have risen in stature among the rebel groups partly because they are the best-equipped fighters they have; while the west sat and worried about the Syrian opposition becoming a vector for extremists, we've allowed the extremists to gain a significant foothold), but the Syrian people (regardless of whose side they're on) deserve a chance at not being murdered by the fascists in charge. Of course these "values" are vague. I'm not trying to exhaustively list them here. If you want a more concrete list, the Universal Dec. of Human Rights seems like a good place to start. Or, hell, the Declaration of Independence. They're the things we consider essential to being a human -- freedom of conscience, freedom from fear and want, the right to have a say in how you're governed, and (of course) a basic right to live. Those are universal to the human race, and if we and the international community can change the worst violations of those rights, then I think we have a moral obligation to do so. icarus -- I think you're assuming quite a bit I did not advocate. Regardless, I'm not sure that the sanctions we've placed on Syria have done much to "inflame" our allies. They seem to be in agreement with the USA on Syria. And given that the sanctions on Syria are quite aggressive right now, I doubt there is much more we could propose. In regards to Saudi Arabia, I'm no expert on international law, nor am I an expert on the WTO. Even if we could not pursue sanctions against Saudi Arabia, we could, perhaps, stop providing them with military hardware or cooperating with them otherwise. Yes, that would have large consequences for US policy in the Middle East (given how we seem to see SA as a bulwark against Iran), but so it goes. No one said doing the right thing was easy. And, yes, as much as "sanctions" means "not trading with" the regimes we're talking about, they are a necessary consequence of accepting the proposition that to aid despotic regimes is an injustice. Yes, trade can benefit the whole of these societies, but certainly in most cases it simply helps to prop up the regimes in question. " If the rest of the world does not benefit from American values imposed by American arms or American sanctions, they live in darkness? " You're confusing what that sentence refers to. "The alternative" is not an alternative to America saving the world -- it's the alternative to recognizing we have a moral obligation to act justly. And note that the examples given in the following sentence are not expressly about how the rest of the world lives, but rather about how we act towards them. I am not saying that the rest of the world (which is to say, the world that is not currently living under liberal democracy) will never rise out of their oppression without American (or Western) aid. But the struggle will be harder, and the lives lost greater, if we don't aid them. And if we actually aid oppressive regimes, we make that task immensely tougher. As far as this being some sort of neo-colonialist enterprise, this differs in how it approaches the undeveloped world. I am not saying that the West has some special monopoly on civilization that must be shared with the rest of the world for their own good. I am saying that in cases where these people are fighting for their own rights -- rights we take for granted -- we have an obligation to help them. That's quite a bit different from invading the Philippines and instituting colonial rule "for their own good." The "White Man's Burden" was wrong in its vision of racial and cultural superiority, but I do not think it was wrong in suggesting that more developed nations have a distinct responsibility to undeveloped nations, though it was wrong on the nature of the problem (the problem is not some cultural weakness on the part of Arabs or Africans or whoever -- it's a problem of despotism, which all nations face regardless of how technologically advanced they are) and the solution to it (colonial rule by one nation over another is hardly what I'm advocating here). I think the opposing view -- that we owe nothing to the rest of the world, that our rights are purely political constructs that we owe to Americans by dint of our shared agreements, but which are not owed in any way or form to the rest of the world, and which we do not need to help these people fight for -- is more akin to the realities of colonialism and the moral system it proposed: the white people on top, and everyone else on the bottom by nature of their inferior race. Perhaps the reasoning and basis is different, but I don't think the result is very different at all.
- zuludown
January 11, 2013 at 3:11pm
And what if the arming of the rebels, whoever is doing it, is exactly what is leading to the murder of civilians in Syria? We are to decide which rebellions, which rebels, are "good rebels" and should be assisted with arms to topple an existing government, whatever consequences that brings for the population? Worse, we are to send our own children into harm's way for the purpose of doing so? How did Americans become the arbiters of just and unjust violence when our own defense is not at issue? How did Americans become obliged to contribute to and even engage in violence whenever we determine it is just to do so? And how do we restrain every other nation from making the identical judgments based on its own concept of justice? There are those in the Moslem world who believe that our presence, control, influence, support of various regimes in the Moslem world is unjust. They think that is ample and just reason for attacking us and arming others to do so. How are they different in trying to topple regimes we support, or indeed the US itself, from what you advocate? Because we are right and just and they are not and that is manifest? It all sounds very lovely and noble, zuludown, but the consequences are rather ugly. The world has struggled, with some success and plenty of failure, to create a system of collective security in order that individual nations do not get to decide what is just conflict and what is not, what is acceptable violence not in self-defense and what is not. This, precisely because nations have a high likelihood of confusing their own self-interest with justice while using justice claims to legitimize their self-interested violence. The history is very long and sordid. In Libya, there was UN sanction, collective security at work, although we surely stretched the mandate to and perhaps beyond its limit. We did not to my knowledge aid any violent revolt in Egypt. You think we have a right, let alone a moral obligation, to do so in Syria just by virtue of being a wealth Western nation? it is quite simply not our mission to civilize the world by force of arms, no matter how one attempts to wrap it in surpassing virtue and human rights claims.
- roidubouloi
January 11, 2013 at 10:32pm
I sat in a small auditorium and heard Madeline Albright, Nick Kristof, and Richard Williamson discuss the "responsibility to protect." All considered it a step forward for human rights. Not one was able even to begin to articulate any principled way, outside of the framework of collective security, for determining who can, must, should intervene in an internal conflict and in what manner. And all were pretty candid about their inability to do so. Yet you seem confident that you know how to discern, zuludown.
- roidubouloi
January 11, 2013 at 10:37pm
Roid-- It is one thing to say, "Yes, we have a responsibility to protect others from violations of their human rights, but it is difficult to establish a set of rules and regulations that will cover each and every circumstance." I think that's a concession to the realities of international politics and the differences between situations. It's absolutely correct, bu I don't think that observation has much bearing on the discussion at hand, since it agrees with the basic point at issue -- that there IS a responsibility to protect. It is another thing entirely to say, "Anyone who advocates intervention -- violent or otherwise -- on behalf of human rights is a 'neocon' or a warmonger or whatever." And that is exactly the line being articulated by many commenters on this magazine. Also, you continue to put words in my mouth. I never said (or even implied) that the United States should pursue some sort of individual military action against the Syrian government. Indeed, my point was that any sort of action has to be a part of a larger international effort -- pure statistics show that US intervention by itself rarely works, while international efforts do. This is likely because of issues of perceived legitimacy, but whatever the reason the facts are that the US must pursue change through the liberal international institutions it created. And, yes, I absolutely would argue that the difference between those extremist Muslims advocating toppling Western and Western-aligned governments and ourselves is that we are right and they are wrong. Their moral system is outmoded and fundamentally incorrect, as much as it does not admit the sort of universal rights that we tend to accept. So, yes, you (or, rather, the international community) has to decide which side better represents justice when deciding when to intervene. How horrifying, I know. But the international community HAS done this in the past (Kosovo, South Africa, Libya, etc.) and it can continue to do so, provided that the liberal democracies that are currently the most powerful nations in the world continue to lead on these issues.
- zuludown
January 12, 2013 at 1:59am
I didn't say, "It is difficult to establish a set of rules and regulations that will cover each and every circumstance." I said that amongst Albright, Kristof, and Williamson, none was able even to begin to articulate any principles as to when, how, and who should intervene in order to give concrete effect to "R2P," as the cognoscenti like to call it. That is rather the opposite pole from rules for every circumstance. When judgment and discretion become the rule, who decides becomes critical. Collective action, with the lead taken by regional actors, would seem to be the best solution for now, at least absent UNSC action. The problem with your doctrine, however, zuludown, is that you do not distinguish humanitarian intervention from regime change. They might be inseparable in a given instance, but not necessarily so. Thus far, the law of war permits war in the cases of self-defense, UNSC authorization, and "an evolving doctrine of humanitarian intervention." There is no legal basis for war fought for regime change that is not necessarily a consequence of these three legal bases for war. In Libya, we co-opted authorization for R2P for the purpose of regime change. The consequences are far from certain. As I warned here several times during the conflict, rather blatantly co-opting humanitarian intervention for the purpose of regime change might mean that the Libya UNSC would be both the first and last time such intervention is authorized. The collective unwillingness and inability to act in Syria may be the first rotten fruit of a cavalier attitude toward legality in Libya. Does Syria even call for humanitarian intervention? It is a war to be sure. Civilians are being killed, but in modern warfare that is the norm. Plenty of civilians were killed in Iraq. That does not by itself prove that the boundaries of the permissible in warfare are being exceeded in Syria, although no doubt they have been in some cases and no doubt by both sides. What then is the basis for intervention? Humanitarian intervention or regime change? You have not articulated any principle that might make regime change a legal basis for war other than, "We are right and they are wrong." I happen to think that we are right and they are wrong, but that is not a basis upon which a stable system that limits violence could possibly by based. Rather, it is a prescription for endless warfare, with the best of intentions of course.
- roidubouloi
January 12, 2013 at 2:13pm
Regime change that has no necessary basis in self-defense, the responsibility to protect, or UNSC authorization is properly identified with neo-cons. It is their doctrine of illegal warfare, and the explicitly couldn't give a crap about legality. Do you, zuludown? Or are you indeed a neo-con wearing humanitarian feathers?
- roidubouloi
January 12, 2013 at 2:16pm