THE TREATMENT JULY 26, 2009
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Can health reform make medical care less expensive over time, as President Obama and his allies claim? And, as we think about whether health reform is a good idea, does anything besides this effort at cost control really matter?
A lot of people seem to think the answer to both questions is “no.” And if they didn’t think that way before this weekend, they may think it now, thanks to a Saturday announcement from the Congressional Budget Office.
Flipping through channels on Sunday morning, I heard Charles Krauthammer assert as much on "Inside Washington." Expanding insurance coverage while controlling costs is a fantasy, he suggested. It's time to abandon the whole effort.
But this view--which, I know, plenty of people share--is based on a misreading of what the CBO has been saying. It’s also based on a misunderstanding of what reform can, and should, accomplish.
If you'll indulge some serious wonkishness, I'll give a shot at explaining it all.
Let’s start with that CBO announcement. As you may recall, earlier this month the CBO analyzed the House’s version of reform. Architects of that bill had promised that the bill would help “bend the curve”--that is, slowly make medical care more efficient and, in the process, hold down its costs. When the CBO disagreed, saying the bill wasn’t aggressive enough about controlling costs--too many pilot programs, the CBO said, and not enough system-wide changes--the administration suggested adding a new wrinkle.
In particular, the administration suggested creating a new board of medical experts who would have authority to decide how Medicare pays for services. This board, the administration promised, would rejigger Medicare so that it rewarded efficiency--and, in the process, spark changes throughout the health care system.

The board was to be modeled on an existing institution, called the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC). The administration proposed calling its new creation the Independent Medicare Advisory Commission (IMAC). The problem with MedPAC is that nobody listens to it. IMAC’s recommendations were to take effect automatically, unless the president or Congress voted to ignore it. The theory was that such reversals would be pretty uncommon.
Budget Director Peter Orszag promoted the IMAC idea heavily, calling it a “game-changer.” So did West Virginia Senator Jay Rockefeller and Tennessee Congressman Jim Cooper, who had been touting a similar idea for the last few weeks. The fact that Rockefeller, a staunch liberal, and Cooper, a well-known centrist, agreed on this idea gives you a sense of its broad support across the ideological spectrum.
But the CBO was still unimpressed. In an analysis requested by the House leadership and published on Saturday, CBO said it wasn’t confident the IMAC would have a significant impact on costs over time. Among other things, CBO said, the president and Congress might defy expectations and vote to overrule the commission’s recommendations. Or they might just cut off IMAC's funding, rendering it powerless.
Lots of reformers (myself included) were unhappy about this. But, to be fair, the CBO has actually been pretty consistent in explaining how it views costs.
As far as it is concerned, there are a few changes guaranteed to bring down costs significantly over the long run: Change the tax exclusion for group health insurance, so that employers and employees alike have less incentive to purchase generous insurance; write into the law some kind of budget limit on federal health spending, perhaps in the form of automatic spending reductions that go into effect should federal spending get too high; force changes in the way health care is delivered, by pushing doctors into group practices that pay based on salary; change Medicare so that even senior citizens with generous Medigap plans have to pay higher cost-sharing.
The CBO has also said that some other reforms--like better use of information technology, studying which treatments work best, and so on--might bring down the cost of medical care. But the CBO thinks the evidence on the impact of these is lot more speculative. As such, it won’t certify them as definite savers. They are just possible savers.
So, just to review, CBO has not said reforming health care can’t reduce costs. It has not even said the current reform bills can’t reduce costs. It has merely said that the current reform bill don't seem likely to reduce costs, based on its very conservative reading of the evidence, but that a more aggressive reform bill would.
And that means there are now three options on the table.
One is to follow the CBO instructions to the letter--to revise the reform plan further so that it includes either a stronger IMAC, some form of an exclusion cap, or some combination of the two. If a bill includes these measures, CBO is likely to certify--as it has not yet--that reform will indeed reduce the cost of medical care over the long run.
This is the approach Obama and his allies seem to favor--and this is, in many ways, to their great credit. After all, the previous president and his allies rarely took the projections of government actuaries so seriously. And there is far more grounds now than there was then for questioning the projections. Plenty of experts believe that CBO has been too pessimistic in its outlook about reform--and too definitive in its pronouncements.
A second option would be to ignore the CBO, given the inherent uncertainty in these projections, and to push ahead with the reform plans as they already written. Remember, these plans more or less pay for themselves in the first ten years of the federal budget window. (The House plan has a problem paying for itself after the tenth year, although--as I wrote earlier--it’s not clear how big that problem really is.) And they do include some payment reforms that should make medical care more efficient.
Quite possibly, that will be enough to make health care less expensive over time. And if not, well, then we’ll still have made health insurance available to almost every American--a huge accomplishment that will spare millions of people financial and physical hardship. It would be, again, the single biggest accomplishment in domestic policy since the Great Society. We wouldn't have solved our long-term fiscal problems. But we wouldn't have made them appreciably worse, either.
A third option would be to give up on reform altogether--that is, to do nothing. Medical care would keep getting more expensive, health insurance would keep getting more inaccessible. An insurance policy would cost $20,000 a year instead of $12,000 like it does today, leading to 60 million uninsured instead of 45 million. Even those people with insurance would increasingly find themselves without enough coverage, or the right coverage, for their particular medical needs. The cost of care would continue to impose a crushing burden on the private sector, just as it does government. It would be, in short, a world of hurt.
I suspect this is the option Krauthammer and his allies prefer. Do you?
--Jonathan Cohn
21 comments
You forgot another alternative, and that involves taxes the bottom 60% in the US so that their tax rates are in-line with their counterparts in the UK, Canada, Sweden, etc. Today they are a fraction of their counterparts' taxes in other countries.
That accomplishes a few important things: First, it ensures the bottom 50% have skin in the game. Today, they do not. Second, it generates 500B annually in cold hard cash that we don't have today. That is more than enough to pay to get all 50M uninsured into the healthcare system.
- SeattleEngineer
July 27, 2009 at 2:27am
Or you could start over and adopt reform that would be effective and free of the problems which are legitimately causing the opposition to the current plan. Specifically,
1. Require everyone to have a basic plan the benefits of which are defined by the government but which include a high annual deductible and a required annual examination. Impose a surtax (equal to double the insurance premium on anyone who cheats and doesn't get insurance.)
2. Require all insurance companies to offer the basic plan to anyone who wants it no questions asked with the premium determined only by age, gender, area of residence, smoking (and maybe obesity). Impose draconian penalties on any insurance company who tries to cheat by cherry picking.
3. Allow insurance companies to sell additional insurance beyond the basic plan but only to customers who have already bought the basic plan.
4. Replace Medicaid by having the government pay the premium for the basic plan for those below a defined income level. Provide an additional subsidy which pays for lowered deductibles with lower incomes.
5. Don't touch Medicare because you will get politically crucified if you try to do so.
- dtohmatsu
July 27, 2009 at 4:15am
The health care system needs to be scrapped and rebuilt from the ground up. Instead of attempting to retool a broken piece of crap, we need to start with a definitive goal, "health care for all" and build a system to achieve that goal.
As of now, the moneyed interests and their toadies in congress will prevent any "real" reform. Insurance is a scam. Period. Until we all accept the unequivocal reality that health insurance IS NOT meant to be a solution, nothing will ever truly change. Health insurance is a snake oil. Nothing more. It was a scam devised by clever salesman and promoted by our elected officials as a magical cure-all for controlling health care costs. Health insurance was a lie and will always be a lie.
"Socialist" countries impose tax rates that are higher than ours, but no one seems to be able to do the math. We currently pay 35% percent of our income (%40 if self-employed) in income taxes and get exactly NOTHING in return for our donation. Bupkiss.
On the other hand, England, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, France, and hundreds of other countries who have "Socialist" governments impose taxes that are 10% to 15% higher BUT offer FREE education and FREE health care to ALL citizens.
On average their populations are more healthy, better educated and generally more content than Americans. Sounds damned good to me ... I am more than willing to pay more in taxes if my nieces and nephews are guaranteed an education and I don't have to worry about being bankrupted for a health issue.
How do they do this? Simple, they figured out a long time ago that a happy, educated population is critical to the success of their entire society. Therefore, they took an approach that put their people first and not moneyed interests.
- pburton16
July 27, 2009 at 8:31am
Don't know what the capacity limit is on a post here, but I am going to try pasting in a letter on health care reform that I wrote to Robert Rubin, then economic adviser to President Clinton, a full 15 years ago. I got back a polite reply (he claimed to recall our brief encounter but who knows). Needless to say, no paid the slightest attention then, and no one will now either. But it is amusing to see how little has changed.
- roidubouloi
July 27, 2009 at 8:55am
July 26, 1994
Mr. Robert E. Rubin
Assistant to the President on Economic Policy
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. Rubin:
I write to you with that precious commodity, free advice. Although my letter concerns the President's pending program for reform of the health care system, I am addressing it to you, rather than to the health care task force, in the hope that a very fragile connection between us may gain your attention and because I am certain that you have more than a little to say about the ultimate shape of health care reform.
Twelve years ago, while a young associate at Sullivan & Cromwell, I sought a job with you in the arbitrage department of Goldman Sachs & Co. I recall describing to you my ambition for a ten-year career in the financial world to be followed, I hoped, by a career of public service. I was completely unaware at the time that you were already heavily involved in Democratic party politics and no doubt amused. I did not end up as an arbitrageur. Rather, I joined the leveraged buyout group of [ ], from which I retired two years ago. In the course of my ten years there, I acquired companies in a diverse range of businesses, serving at various times as financial analyst, director, chief financial officer, and chief executive officer. I was compelled to manage two companies through successful financial and operational re-structurings and developed a bit of expertise in cost accounting. I also have a physics background and sit on the board of a private institute devoted to studying the social impact of science.
I find myself deeply disturbed by what I read in the press about the direction that health care reform seems to be taking. The political climate is such that there appears to be an historic opportunity to solve a profound problem of our national economic and social life. But the solutions proposed under the rubrics of "managed competition," "health care alliances," and "employer mandate" will, I believe, not only fail, but will create problems far worse and far more widespread than those from which we currently suffer. The problems that I foresee result, in my opinion, directly from the failure to frame the problem correctly.
At least rhetorically, there appears to be no recognition that the "health care crisis" consists of a number of very different problems. While the solutions to these problems certainly bear on one another, successful solutions to these diverse problems are likely to come from very different sources, and are even potentially inconsistent. There is no global problem with the health care system, and there is no global solution. Among the distinct problems that I can identify are: (1) wide disparities in the quality of care available in different communities and to people of different means, (2) inadequate and very uneven quality assurance for medical care, (3) over- and under-consumption of health care resources, (4) persistent real increases in the cost of health care, (5) the fact that some Americans are too poor to purchase commercial health insurance, (6) the fact that some Americans are uninsurable through commercial channels due to the current state of their health, (7) the withdrawal of insurance coverage or benefits from people who develop expensive illnesses, (8) lack of transportability of health insurance, (9) the fact that some Americans are not served at all by the commercial health insurance market, (10) discrepancies between Medicare and Medicaid compensation levels and commercial rates, (11) the extent of fraud in the payment system, (12) the percentage of health care expenses consumed by administration, and (13) the interaction of health costs, which are often borne by employers, and the competitive posture of both business and of job seekers.
Before continuing with my free advice, I wish to state my opinion that it is principally the health insurance system, and not the delivery of health care, that is broken (except insofar as the insurance system has had some very negative consequences for the delivery of care). In short, in my opinion, most of the identified problems are actually problems of, or caused by, the structure of health care finance, which ought to have a financial solution. A sweeping reorganization of health care delivery to address those financing problems is far too ambitious and completely unnecessary, creating the strong likelihood that the "solution" will (A) not solve the "problem" and (B) will create hitherto unforeseen and potentially much greater problems with the delivery of care. The part that ain't broke don't need fixin'.
Those problems that relate to the technical quality of care require scientific and medical-organizational-educational solution, and they are absolutely certain to be gravely aggravated by the governmentally imposed creation of monolithic health care delivery systems in a misguided effort to address the financing problem. A proper system of financial/profit incentives could, however, go a long way to stimulating the market to solve the technical problems.
The problem of the unaffordability of health insurance for a portion of the population has nothing whatever to do with the health care system. For those unable to afford health insurance in a competitive marketplace, we have only a few options: raise their income until they can afford health insurance, provide for their care (the system "self-insuring" for them), subsidize their insurance, or leave them with inadequate care. None of this has the remotest thing to do with the "health care system" any more than the fact that they cannot afford expensive new cars has to do with the "car production system." I believe it is our historical practice of making this problem of poverty into a "health care system" problem that has caused a great deal of the trouble we are now in.
The financing problems (as distinct from the problem of financing health care for the poor) result, I believe, from the failure to recognize that the health care system functions in the economy as if services were subsidized and as though providers having oligopoly pricing power, because demand for consumption, which is virtually costless for the insured individual, is so highly inelastic. As a practical matter health care is subsidized in the market sense because, through the medium of insurance, the consumer never faces the real costs of furnishing his or her care. Moreover, unless we are going to eliminate the insurance concept from the financing of health care (which would make the cost of serious illness unaffordable for most people much of the time), this aspect of the system can never be eliminated. Insurers, who form the real demand side of the market, cannot easily control either the cost, or the level of consumption, of medical services without profound ethical problems and enormous resistance from both insureds and providers. Given the inelasticity of the demand for insurance, it is easier for the insurers, ultimately, simply to intermediate between the providers and the consumers, at great social cost.
All of the proposed "managed care" solutions that I have read about do nothing whatsoever to alter these economics. They simply put the insurers in the business of not only financing care but providing it. If large organizations could provide competitive, quality "managed" medical care on an integrated basis, undercutting the cost of health insurance, there is absolutely no reason to believe that the market would not long since have generated such a solution. If they are to be organized as "cooperatives" there is not a shred of historical evidence that they will succeed. I have competed against cooperatives in some of my businesses, and they are lousy competitors who grow only more and more inefficient with time and would generally fail in competition with commercial providers if they were not "politically" protected. You of all people should realize that even so-called "not-for-profit" organizations still need capital and that someone must still pay the economic cost of that capital. The real difference between the cooperative and a commercial organization is that the cooperative is not held to account by the provider of its capital. The current Empire Blue Shield/Blue Cross scandal in New York is a perfect example of the problems which eventually overwhelm "cooperatives" that are not responsible for returning a profit to an owner. Surely, the general trend in the insurance industry away from mutual companies in the direction of stock companies ought to say something relevant to this debate. What is certain is that monolithic providers will be increasingly unresponsive to both medical care workers and medical care consumers.
Much has been made of the relative success of large employers in controlling medical costs for their employees. This is held out as an analogy for managed competition. Of course, their success is only relative to the widespread failure of insurers to control health care costs. And the only reason they are remotely successful is that, unlike the health insurers, they cannot pass on their costs, demand for their products being generally much more elastic than health insurance.
Totally lost in all of the discussion about the "out-of-control" cost of medical care is any analysis by anyone of just what it is that has caused the increases. We read that the increase in the cost of medical care has been outstripping inflation. But why? Have the incomes of medical professionals increased in real terms (The New York Times recently reported that, over the last ten years, the real incomes of doctors increased by 40% while the real incomes of almost everyone else in the economy were nearly unchanged.) Has there been an increase in the real services provided? If so, are the increases justified by improved medical outcomes? Are the increases necessary for the medical outcomes? Are more people participating in the system on a subsidized basis inflating the apparent cost for those providing the subsidies? Is there in fact an over-capacity of medical care which, through the media of insurance and governmental regulation, has passed on its excess costs to the consumer?
I believe the answer to all of these questions is that there does not exist a functional market for health care, as a direct consequence of the existence of health insurance. And so long as there is health insurance, there cannot be a normally functioning market for health care. That leaves us with only three options: (1) abandon health insurance, (2) abandon private medical care, or (3) create a pseudo-market in those parts of the system that do not and cannot naturally behave as a functioning market. Understandably, all of the health care reform proposals addressed in some manner only the last alternative. But they fail to take note of just which aspects of the system fail to function as a market, and fail to limit intervention to the creation of a functioning market in those areas. Thus, the scope of all of the plans is simultaneously way too ambitious and inadequate to solve our problems.
With that introduction, I suggest that a comprehensive solution to the "health care crisis" can be achieved as follows:
1. Establish on a national basis a cost accounting system for health care based entirely on conventional techniques. This requires estimating the consumption of various services, the capacity (including standby capacity) required to provide those services, the capital costs of creating the capacity (including medical education), the cost of inputs where the industry is a price taker, and the standard income for practitioners with an average volume. Inputs can be priced on an indexed basis that takes account of local variations in cost of living and of goods and services that are available only in local and not national or regional markets.
2. All medical insurers, government and private, should be precluded by law from paying above the standard cost of goods and services indexed for local cost of living variations. Deductibles and co-insurance should be permitted.
3. Medical providers should be permitted to charge whatever the market will bear, provided that there is a clear written consent by the consumer to pay above the standard rate.
4. To facilitate market management, medical providers should be required to report instances in which they charge above or below the standard rate. Where they charge below the standard rate, the consumer should be permitted to apply 100% of the short-fall toward co-insurance and deductibles. This will give and incentive to providers to cut their rates where there are surpluses and encourage consumers to shop. The extent of above- and below-standard rate charges can be used to gauge when and whether shortages or surpluses are developing and adjustments to the standard rates are required to induce capacity into or out of the health care market. Thus, a standard cost system can still play the essential role of market prices in signaling the need for more or less supply.
5. Localities should be permitted to request waivers for insurers to pay above-standard rates where shortages can be demonstrated, thereby inducing additional supply into the local provider market.
6. Once a system is created in which medical providers are price takers, they should all, including hospitals, be permitted to exit the market freely through normal bankruptcy proceedings.
7. The federal government should sponsor the development of a national diagnostic computer system. Protocols can be developed by the top medical research and clinical institutions under contract. Practitioners being paid by insurers would be expected to input the results of examinations, patient reports, and tests in order to be paid. The protocol would state on a probabilistic basis the possible diagnoses and the recommended procedures. Authorized procedures would automatically be authorized for payment. Atypical procedures could be authorized upon consultation. Outcomes would also be required to be input. Patterns of unusual consumption of particular procedures or unusual incidence of diagnoses would provide a basis for fraud audits. As a side benefit, the nation would develop an extraordinary database for evaluating practitioners, procedures, and the incidence and ultimately the causes of medical problems.
8. The structure of policies that insurers are permitted to offer should be regulated so that they can be readily compared. Each insurer should be required to offer a standardized basic minimum package.
9. Insurers would be prohibited from discriminating in their rates on any basis other than age. The tax code should support an analog of whole-life insurance that, through inside build-up on a tax-deferred basis, would smooth the premium payment stream over the life of the insured. It might incidentally help the anemic U.S. savings rate. Insureds moving from a more restrictive to a less restrictive benefit policy would be excluded from enjoying the higher benefit on any medical condition in existence in the year preceding the change. But, as is now the case in New York, anyone switching carriers would be given credit for time covered under another carrier's policy.
10. The government should sponsor re-insurance pools for excess incidence of expensive conditions.
11. All industrial companies should be prohibited from providing medical insurance via self-insurance programs. All medical insurance would have to be provided by licensed insurance companies satisfying normal regulatory requirements for solvency and management. Insurers would be prohibited from providing group discounts. All policies should be available to any comer on the basis of the same published tariffs. Insurers would be permitted to negotiate a large contract and then reduce their tariffs to fit, provided that all of the insurer's clients are then given "most favored nation" status.
12. Tax subsidies for employer provided insurance should be eliminated.
13. All taxpayers should be charged a tax on adjusted gross income based on the number of members of the family, and their age. All taxpayers should receive a credit, payable directly to a licensed insurer, toward the cost of medical insurance -- "Take or Pay." In the aggregate, the taxes and the credits would be equal. Anyone not enrolled with a private insurer would be insured for minimum basic coverage purchased in the market by the federal government on a blind auction basis analogous to the marketing of Treasury securities. The total tax collected less the credits issued would be expected to finance the purchase of insurance for all those not purchasing private insurance. Insurers would be expected to report directly their enrollees in order to be paid.
14. Medical insurance, rather than employment or anything else, should be taxed to provide the revenues necessary to finance the purchase by the federal government of commercially available insurance for people too poor, too young or otherwise not paying income taxes. Taxation of health insurance rather than some other part of the economy would have the collateral benefit for health care of limiting the pricing power of insurers. Everyone with a social security number would be insured either via the income tax credit system or as part of a default pool for which the government would purchase basic minimum coverage. All insurance, whether privately or government purchased, would pay exactly the same rates under all policies, instantly eliminating substandard care for the poor! Indeed, we could expect aggressive competition for poor customers to emerge rather quickly.
15. Health care alliances, managed care systems, and the like should not receive any sort of government preference. Once a functioning price system is created for health care, the private sector will find the best means of balancing cost and quality through normal competition. Government intervention can do nothing but mess it up.
That is it. These things are sufficient to solve the entire problem of health care financing without creating distortions in the labor market. Equally important, such a system will provide to health care all of the benefits of market competition without the need for a large government bureaucracy. About 20 health care economists, 100 cost accountants, a dozen systems programmers, 100 computer application programmers, 20 purchasing agents, and 500 computer clerks should be able to do the job. Done right, figure on 1,000 people total.
Best of luck.
Sincerely,
cc: Senator Daniel P. Moynihan
Senator Edward M. Kennedy
Mr. Ira Magaziner
Ms. Hillary R. Clinton
- roidubouloi
July 27, 2009 at 9:08am
July 26, 1994
Mr. Robert E. Rubin
Assistant to the President on Economic Policy
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. Rubin:
I write to you with that precious commodity, free advice. Although my letter concerns the President's pending program for reform of the health care system, I am addressing it to you, rather than to the health care task force, in the hope that a very fragile connection between us may gain your attention and because I am certain that you have more than a little to say about the ultimate shape of health care reform.
Twelve years ago, while a young associate at Sullivan & Cromwell, I sought a job with you in the arbitrage department of Goldman Sachs & Co. I recall describing to you my ambition for a ten-year career in the financial world to be followed, I hoped, by a career of public service. I was completely unaware at the time that you were already heavily involved in Democratic party politics and no doubt amused. I did not end up as an arbitrageur. Rather, I joined the leveraged buyout group of [ ], from which I retired two years ago. In the course of my ten years there, I acquired companies in a diverse range of businesses, serving at various times as financial analyst, director, chief financial officer, and chief executive officer. I was compelled to manage two companies through successful financial and operational re-structurings and developed a bit of expertise in cost accounting. I also have a physics background and sit on the board of a private institute devoted to studying the social impact of science.
I find myself deeply disturbed by what I read in the press about the direction that health care reform seems to be taking. The political climate is such that there appears to be an historic opportunity to solve a profound problem of our national economic and social life. But the solutions proposed under the rubrics of "managed competition," "health care alliances," and "employer mandate" will, I believe, not only fail, but will create problems far worse and far more widespread than those from which we currently suffer. The problems that I foresee result, in my opinion, directly from the failure to frame the problem correctly.
At least rhetorically, there appears to be no recognition that the "health care crisis" consists of a number of very different problems. While the solutions to these problems certainly bear on one another, successful solutions to these diverse problems are likely to come from very different sources, and are even potentially inconsistent. There is no global problem with the health care system, and there is no global solution. Among the distinct problems that I can identify are: (1) wide disparities in the quality of care available in different communities and to people of different means, (2) inadequate and very uneven quality assurance for medical care, (3) over- and under-consumption of health care resources, (4) persistent real increases in the cost of health care, (5) the fact that some Americans are too poor to purchase commercial health insurance, (6) the fact that some Americans are uninsurable through commercial channels due to the current state of their health, (7) the withdrawal of insurance coverage or benefits from people who develop expensive illnesses, (8) lack of transportability of health insurance, (9) the fact that some Americans are not served at all by the commercial health insurance market, (10) discrepancies between Medicare and Medicaid compensation levels and commercial rates, (11) the extent of fraud in the payment system, (12) the percentage of health care expenses consumed by administration, and (13) the interaction of health costs, which are often borne by employers, and the competitive posture of both business and of job seekers.
Before continuing with my free advice, I wish to state my opinion that it is principally the health insurance system, and not the delivery of health care, that is broken (except insofar as the insurance system has had some very negative consequences for the delivery of care). In short, in my opinion, most of the identified problems are actually problems of, or caused by, the structure of health care finance, which ought to have a financial solution. A sweeping reorganization of health care delivery to address those financing problems is far too ambitious and completely unnecessary, creating the strong likelihood that the "solution" will (A) not solve the "problem" and (B) will create hitherto unforeseen and potentially much greater problems with the delivery of care. The part that ain't broke don't need fixin'.
Those problems that relate to the technical quality of care require scientific and medical-organizational-educational solution, and they are absolutely certain to be gravely aggravated by the governmentally imposed creation of monolithic health care delivery systems in a misguided effort to address the financing problem. A proper system of financial/profit incentives could, however, go a long way to stimulating the market to solve the technical problems.
The problem of the unaffordability of health insurance for a portion of the population has nothing whatever to do with the health care system. For those unable to afford health insurance in a competitive marketplace, we have only a few options: raise their income until they can afford health insurance, provide for their care (the system "self-insuring" for them), subsidize their insurance, or leave them with inadequate care. None of this has the remotest thing to do with the "health care system" any more than the fact that they cannot afford expensive new cars has to do with the "car production system." I believe it is our historical practice of making this problem of poverty into a "health care system" problem that has caused a great deal of the trouble we are now in.
The financing problems (as distinct from the problem of financing health care for the poor) result, I believe, from the failure to recognize that the health care system functions in the economy as if services were subsidized and as though providers having oligopoly pricing power, because demand for consumption, which is virtually costless for the insured individual, is so highly inelastic. As a practical matter health care is subsidized in the market sense because, through the medium of insurance, the consumer never faces the real costs of furnishing his or her care. Moreover, unless we are going to eliminate the insurance concept from the financing of health care (which would make the cost of serious illness unaffordable for most people much of the time), this aspect of the system can never be eliminated. Insurers, who form the real demand side of the market, cannot easily control either the cost, or the level of consumption, of medical services without profound ethical problems and enormous resistance from both insureds and providers. Given the inelasticity of the demand for insurance, it is easier for the insurers, ultimately, simply to intermediate between the providers and the consumers, at great social cost.
All of the proposed "managed care" solutions that I have read about do nothing whatsoever to alter these economics. They simply put the insurers in the business of not only financing care but providing it. If large organizations could provide competitive, quality "managed" medical care on an integrated basis, undercutting the cost of health insurance, there is absolutely no reason to believe that the market would not long since have generated such a solution. If they are to be organized as "cooperatives" there is not a shred of historical evidence that they will succeed. I have competed against cooperatives in some of my businesses, and they are lousy competitors who grow only more and more inefficient with time and would generally fail in competition with commercial providers if they were not "politically" protected. You of all people should realize that even so-called "not-for-profit" organizations still need capital and that someone must still pay the economic cost of that capital. The real difference between the cooperative and a commercial organization is that the cooperative is not held to account by the provider of its capital. The current Empire Blue Shield/Blue Cross scandal in New York is a perfect example of the problems which eventually overwhelm "cooperatives" that are not responsible for returning a profit to an owner. Surely, the general trend in the insurance industry away from mutual companies in the direction of stock companies ought to say something relevant to this debate. What is certain is that monolithic providers will be increasingly unresponsive to both medical care workers and medical care consumers.
Much has been made of the relative success of large employers in controlling medical costs for their employees. This is held out as an analogy for managed competition. Of course, their success is only relative to the widespread failure of insurers to control health care costs. And the only reason they are remotely successful is that, unlike the health insurers, they cannot pass on their costs, demand for their products being generally much more elastic than health insurance.
Totally lost in all of the discussion about the "out-of-control" cost of medical care is any analysis by anyone of just what it is that has caused the increases. We read that the increase in the cost of medical care has been outstripping inflation. But why? Have the incomes of medical professionals increased in real terms (The New York Times recently reported that, over the last ten years, the real incomes of doctors increased by 40% while the real incomes of almost everyone else in the economy were nearly unchanged.) Has there been an increase in the real services provided? If so, are the increases justified by improved medical outcomes? Are the increases necessary for the medical outcomes? Are more people participating in the system on a subsidized basis inflating the apparent cost for those providing the subsidies? Is there in fact an over-capacity of medical care that, through the media of insurance and governmental regulation, has passed on its excess costs to the consumer?
I believe the answer to all of these questions is that there does not exist a functional market for health care, as a direct consequence of the existence of health insurance. And so long as there is health insurance, there cannot be a normally functioning market for health care. That leaves us with only three options: (1) abandon health insurance, (2) abandon private medical care, or (3) create a pseudo-market in those parts of the system that do not and cannot naturally behave as a functioning market. Understandably, all of the health care reform proposals addressed in some manner only the last alternative. But they fail to take note of just which aspects of the system fail to function as a market, and fail to limit intervention to the creation of a functioning market in those areas. Thus, the scope of all of the plans is simultaneously way too ambitious and inadequate to solve our problems.
With that introduction, I suggest that a comprehensive solution to the "health care crisis" can be achieved as follows:
1. Establish on a national basis a cost accounting system for health care based entirely on conventional techniques. This requires estimating the consumption of various services, the capacity (including standby capacity) required to provide those services, the capital costs of creating the capacity (including medical education), the cost of inputs where the industry is a price taker, and the standard income for practitioners with an average volume. Inputs can be priced on an indexed basis that takes account of local variations in cost of living and of goods and services that are available only in local and not national or regional markets.
2. All medical insurers, government and private, should be precluded by law from paying above the standard cost of goods and services indexed for local cost of living variations. Deductibles and co-insurance should be permitted.
3. Medical providers should be permitted to charge whatever the market will bear, provided that there is a clear written consent by the consumer to pay above the standard rate.
4. To facilitate market management, medical providers should be required to report instances in which they charge above or below the standard rate. Where they charge below the standard rate, the consumer should be permitted to apply 100% of the short-fall toward co-insurance and deductibles. This will give and incentive to providers to cut their rates where there are surpluses and encourage consumers to shop. The extent of above- and below-standard rate charges can be used to gauge when and whether shortages or surpluses are developing and adjustments to the standard rates are required to induce capacity into or out of the health care market. Thus, a standard cost system can still play the essential role of market prices in signaling the need for more or less supply.
5. Localities should be permitted to request waivers for insurers to pay above-standard rates where shortages can be demonstrated, thereby inducing additional supply into the local provider market.
6. Once a system is created in which medical providers are price takers, they should all, including hospitals, be permitted to exit the market freely through normal bankruptcy proceedings.
7. The federal government should sponsor the development of a national diagnostic computer system. Protocols can be developed by the top medical research and clinical institutions under contract. Practitioners being paid by insurers would be expected to input the results of examinations, patient reports, and tests in order to be paid. The protocol would state on a probabilistic basis the possible diagnoses and the recommended procedures. Authorized procedures would automatically be authorized for payment. Atypical procedures could be authorized upon consultation. Outcomes would also be required to be input. Patterns of unusual consumption of particular procedures or unusual incidence of diagnoses would provide a basis for fraud audits. As a side benefit, the nation would develop an extraordinary database for evaluating practitioners, procedures, and the incidence and ultimately the causes of medical problems.
8. The structure of policies that insurers are permitted to offer should be regulated so that they can be readily compared. Each insurer should be required to offer a standardized basic minimum package.
9. Insurers would be prohibited from discriminating in their rates on any basis other than age. The tax code should support an analog of whole-life insurance that, through inside build-up on a tax-deferred basis, would smooth the premium payment stream over the life of the insured. It might incidentally help the anemic U.S. savings rate. Insureds moving from a more restrictive to a less restrictive benefit policy would be excluded from enjoying the higher benefit on any medical condition in existence in the year preceding the change. But, as is now the case in New York, anyone switching carriers would be given credit for time covered under another carrier's policy.
10. The government should sponsor re-insurance pools for excess incidence of expensive conditions.
11. All industrial companies should be prohibited from providing medical insurance via self-insurance programs. All medical insurance would have to be provided by licensed insurance companies satisfying normal regulatory requirements for solvency and management. Insurers would be prohibited from providing group discounts. All policies should be available to any comer on the basis of the same published tariffs. Insurers would be permitted to negotiate a large contract and then reduce their tariffs to fit, provided that all of the insurer's clients are then given "most favored nation" status.
12. Tax subsidies for employer provided insurance should be eliminated.
13. All taxpayers should be charged a tax on adjusted gross income based on the number of members of the family, and their age. All taxpayers should receive a credit, payable directly to a licensed insurer, toward the cost of medical insurance -- "Take or Pay." In the aggregate, the taxes and the credits would be equal. Anyone not enrolled with a private insurer would be insured for minimum basic coverage purchased in the market by the federal government on a blind auction basis analogous to the marketing of Treasury securities. The total tax collected less the credits issued would be expected to finance the purchase of insurance for all those not purchasing private insurance. Insurers would be expected to report directly their enrollees in order to be paid.
14. Medical insurance, rather than employment or anything else, should be taxed to provide the revenues necessary to finance the purchase by the federal government of commercially available insurance for people too poor, too young or otherwise not paying income taxes. Taxation of health insurance rather than some other part of the economy would have the collateral benefit for health care of limiting the pricing power of insurers. Everyone with a social security number would be insured either via the income tax credit system or as part of a default pool for which the government would purchase basic minimum coverage. All insurance, whether privately or government purchased, would pay exactly the same rates under all policies, instantly eliminating substandard care for the poor! Indeed, we could expect aggressive competition for poor customers to emerge rather quickly.
15. Health care alliances, managed care systems, and the like should not receive any sort of government preference. Once a functioning price system is created for health care, the private sector will find the best means of balancing cost and quality through normal competition. Government intervention can do nothing but mess it up.
That is it. These things are sufficient to solve the entire problem of health care financing without creating distortions in the labor market. Equally important, such a system will provide to health care all of the benefits of market competition without the need for a large government bureaucracy. About 20 health care economists, 100 cost accountants, a dozen systems programmers, 100 computer application programmers, 20 purchasing agents, and 500 computer clerks should be able to do the job. Done right, figure on 1,000 people total.
Best of luck.
Sincerely,
cc: Senator Daniel P. Moynihan
Senator Edward M. Kennedy
Mr. Ira Magaziner
Ms. Hillary R. Clinton
- roidubouloi
July 27, 2009 at 9:11am
Double your pleasure.
- selish70
July 27, 2009 at 9:54am
Is Cheaper Health Care Hopeless? No. And Here's An Honest, Detailed Answer Why , by Jonathan Cohn
- Anonymous
July 27, 2009 at 10:23am
dtohmatsu has some pretty good points there.
The main tweak I would suggest would be to not bother with having a plan in which you had to enroll (which just adds unnecessary administrative overhead if you are going to penalize people for not enrolling), but just automatically provide it and pay for it through taxes.
However I think this is called Single Payor, to which a number of people appear to be allergic for some inexplicable reason.
- Nari224
July 27, 2009 at 11:51am
I hate to be a bore, making the same points over and over again, but...........................
As Paul Krugman, of all people, noted in his blog over the weekend, there are numerous models of "universal " healthcare coverage around the world that differ significantly from each other. The liberal Democrats are fixated on one system, Canada's. That's the one they want, and that's the one they want to shove down your throat. All other alternatives are "off the table".
The liberal Democrats also have fixed ideas about who should and should not sacrifice to bring their Canadian-style system into being. Lay 100% on the affluent; not one copper penny from organized labor or the the plaintiffs' malpractice bar.
If the Republicans whored for their most affluent constituents, affluent small businessmen, the Democrats will not be outdone. Follow the money! Organized labor and the trial lawyers are their untouchables. The Republicans at least admit they're whores; the Democrats want to keep any discussion of prostitution "off the table".
If we were serious about reform, we'd have the CBO "scoring" the various workable foreign health approaches for costs as they would translate to our country and a bi-partisan panel of eminent physicians "score" those systems for health care outcomes as they would translate to our people. Then we could begin to re-think what might work well here. Dream on o heavenly muse!
- lsernoff
July 27, 2009 at 11:59am
How do we discuss health care reform and control of costs and manage to almost never mention some sort of tort reform. I am a physician and quite up to date on evidence. I would say that i may order 30% more tests and admit 30-50% more patients to avoid being dragged into an unpleasant lawsuit. Just the threat of a jury trial with folks who have little or no understanding of my thinking process makes me practice very defensive medicine which is quite expensive.
Why don't people at least add this to the mix when it come to health care cost control? Obama is getting a free, unquestioned pass on this one!!
- zwedon
July 27, 2009 at 1:26pm
lsernoff:
In what way is the "liberal" democrat's preferred system Canada's? I'm not understanding the analogy, especially as there is no "Canadian" health system. Each province runs its own health system independently, albeit with a large chunk of federal funding. Thus, the system in Saskatchewan will look different to the one in Quebec or BC (perhaps iccy can clarify this if I am incorrect).
As for the malpractice bar being a source of revenue, how have things gone for the states that have enacted caps and similar restrictions?
I agree with you about having the CBO score out various foreign systems for comparison. However I do see the merit in the current approach; any wholesale tear-down and build-up of the system is unlikely to fly, so you may as well start out around the edges.
- Nari224
July 27, 2009 at 1:46pm
lsernoff: What makes you think liberal Democrats want to enact a Canadian-style system?
- jhildner
July 27, 2009 at 2:23pm
Sorry, selish70, as often happens on TNR, the first post appeared to fail.
- roidubouloi
July 27, 2009 at 4:40pm
Zwedon, your comments bring me back some years to when I worked for the AMA. Boy, were the physicians in charge there fixated on "defensive medicine"! But the fervent belief of physicians and political conservatives notwithstanding, the evidence on the cost implications of "defensive medicine" is quite thin. No, the cost isn't zero. But the consensus of the health-economics literature, as I understand it, is that defensive medicine accounts for no more than a single-digit percent share of health-care costs. That's not nothing, but addressing it won't do much to contain costs.
- abrod
July 27, 2009 at 9:06pm
Nari,
You wouldn't have the government do it because:
1) The would screw it up like they do everything else.
2) Competition amongst insurance companies would lead to efficiencies and lower administrative costs.
3) Paying for it through taxes would probably end up being redistributive, result in higher taxes, and be a disincentive to savings and investments.
4) If the government was proving the insurance, sooner or later (probably sooner), they would want to start setting reimbursement rates and determining which treatments were acceptable.
Or, put another way, why would you possibly want to involve the government when the markets can do the jobs with minimal government involvement.
- dtohmatsu
July 27, 2009 at 9:21pm
See above. Markets cannot do the job, not now, not ever, unless we are willing to ration care based on teh ability to pay -- the manner in which the market rations all goods.
- roidubouloi
July 27, 2009 at 10:31pm
dtohmatsu needs to do some more reading. Take his point #2. Competition among insurers is generally understood to be a huge part of the problem. It's not the solution--it's the problem. Adverse selection leads insurers to cherry-pick insureds, and it introduces the noxious concept of the pre-existing condition, which should not exist in a civilized society. Private insurers are vastly less efficient than single-payer systems, because the former spend so much money trying to get others to pay. The administrative costs of Medicare are a small fraction of what one sees in the private health-insurance industry. I realize such talk doesn't accord with our secular religion of free enterprise. But markets are a means, not an end. Competition and free markets are the best way for society to allocate its resources... except when they're not. And in health care, they're not. But our religion of free markets is a powerful one, hence risible posts like dtohmatsu's.
- abrod
July 28, 2009 at 1:28am
markets fail when allocating non-segmented goods that have 100% demand, see water, clean.
dhomatsu points
1) Like clean water and social security?
2) Bullshit. It results in adverse selection, collusion, and monopolies, and also, it results in insurance companies charging enough to maximize profits leaving many people with nothing (our current outcome).
3) Half true, half bullshit.
4) Maybe so, that's WAY better than a private insurance bureaucrat deciding, WAY WAY WAY WAY WAY WAY better. Of course, the doctor is best, along with the patient, single payer is the mostly likely outcome of that.
"Or, put another way, why would you possibly want to involve the government when the markets can do the jobs with minimal government involvement."
Because markets fail under this scenario, go find out what a 'non-segmented' good is, I'm sure you already know what 100% demand is.
Markets are great for segmented goods that people don't need to stay alive (DVD players!).
Make your case for privatizing clean water.
- mmathog
July 28, 2009 at 6:13pm
roi and abrod beat me to it, but I'm sure they don't mind me throwing in some extra though... thanks fellas.
- mmathog
July 28, 2009 at 6:15pm
Thank you abrod for your response. I cant imagine how anyone derived at the single digit percent you claim is due to defensive medicine. I am on the front lines and have been so for 30 years and that number seems preposterous.
- zwedon
July 30, 2009 at 9:57am