July 14, 2010
Eli Lake on our secret war against Iran.
June 28, 2004
LAST AUGUST, during my first trip to Iraq, I was struck not by hostility toward the United States for toppling Saddam Hussein—I encountered none—but by a burning ambition among Iraqis to build their country anew. Nothing I saw then and nothing I have learned since has changed my conviction that the war was just. We were right to liberate Iraq and end Saddam's threat to the world. Still, we have learned some bitter lessons in the process. Our intelligence failed--we greatly overestimated Iraq's weapons of mass destruction while underestimating Saddam's destruction of Iraq's human capital.
February 16, 2004
DAVID KAY, THE former chief weapons-hunter in Iraq, last week told the Senate Armed Services Committee there were almost certainly no chemical or biological weapons in Iraq and that Saddam Hussein’s nuclear program had been virtually nonexistent. Coming from a man who, before the war, stridently maintained that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Kay’s testimony was strikingly honest. But Kay’s further analysis was less impressive: “[I]f you read the total body of intelligence in the last twelve to fifteen years, ...