By threatening to resign as CEO, the JPMorgan honcho gave shareholders no choice but to keep him as chairman as well.
Shareholder activists are getting smarter—and could soon claim their biggest scalp
Shareholder activists are getting smarter—and could soon claim their biggest scalp.
Yesterday's discussions in São Paulo dug further into the challenges facing the São Paulo metropolis, the responses that governments are mounting, and obstacles to implementation and long-term prosperity. Among the issues tackled were infrastructure, land use, housing, social inequity, education, governance, and public sector capacity and continuity. Turns out that changing hemispheres doesn't change some things all that much. In that spirit, leaders from an array of U.S.
I didn't watch Jamie Dimon's Senate testimony today, but from the Times live blog it looked like this was the most dramatic moment: Mr. Dimon gets testy for the first time in the hearing. "I think you are misinformed," he told Senator Jeff Merkley, Democrat of Oregon, who said JPMorgan was saved by government bailouts in 2008. "You're factually wrong," Mr.
When Jamie Dimon testifies in the Senate on Wednesday about JP Morgan’s $3 billion trading loss, the focus will almost certainly be on the speculative aspect of the trade. After all, the financial reform bill Congress passed in 2010—specifically, the provision known as the Volcker Rule—was supposed to stop banks from making risky bets with their own money, at least if they benefit from government support.
So let me get this straight. JP Morgan loses more $2 billion, reportedly thanks to the recklessness of a trader nicknamed “the London Whale” and “Lord Voldemort,” and all Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon has to say is “it was bad strategy, executed poorly”? Well, no, that isn’t precisely correct. Dimon also says he remains only “barely” a Democrat because the Democrats want excessive regulations, including the so-called “Volcker Rule” banning some types of proprietary trading.
Ever since the bottom fell out of the financial markets in late 2008, Jamie Dimon has had one overriding message for Washington: Don’t crucify me for the sins of other banks. Or, as Dimon told me two years ago: “It’s never fair to punish everybody regardless of their behavior. There are good banks and bad banks just like there are good politicians and bad politicians.” Other megabanks had vaporized themselves by piling on preposterous amounts of risk—often risks they only dimly understood.
The New York Times floats a list of possible successors to Tim Geithner. My lord, this is horrific: Among those named by people familiar with administration thinking are Jamie Dimon, the chief executive of JPMorgan Chase; Jeffrey R. Immelt, the chairman of General Electric and of Mr. Obama’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness; Roger Altman, a deputy Treasury secretary in the Clinton administration; and Erskine Bowles, a former White House chief of staff to President Bill Clinton and co-chairman of Mr.
There were many factors that led us to the financial crisis of 2008—dangerous derivatives, irresponsible ratings agencies, negligent regulators—but one was more important than the rest. We now know it as the “too big to fail” problem. What brought the economy to the edge of disaster wasn’t only that financial institutions had made rash bets on lousy investments, but that those institutions were so massive that when their bets went bad, they threatened to take the rest of the economy down with them.