How the infitration by a Russian criminal organizaion of Wyndham Hotels led to a major development in cybersecurity policy.
The economy is a long-term problem, but that's not what prevents the U.S. from enacting its interests abroad.
It was his best speech on national security, but it will not quell the controversies.
David Sanger and Thom Shanker have a lengthy story in the New York Times about various National Security Agency techniques for penetrating foreign computers and networks, including a strategy for accessing seemingly air-gapped computers. Two thoughts:
And other national-security debates in these three podcasts
On October 25, the Hoover Institution put together a media colloquium which brought together a group of distinguished journalists who work on national security issues and put them face to face for a day with members of its Jean Perkins Task Force on National Security and Law.
FISA Reform on Capitol Hill
The below is the final installment in a five-part series. Part 1 explored the problems stemming from our collective unwillingness to hold software providers accountable for vulnerability-ridden code. Part 2 argued that the technical challenges associated with minimizing software vulnerabilities weigh in favor of, not against, imposing liability on software makers.
This is the fourth installment in a series on whether and how to hold software makers financially liable for the insecurity of their products. Part I offered an overview of the problem of insecure code. Part II countered the notion that the technical challenges associated with minimizing software vulnerabilities weigh against the creation of any kind of maker-liability regime.
What should we do about the NSA? Should we do anything at all? These question are on the forefront these days.
Count me as very skeptical about the suggestions in recent days that neither the White House nor the congressional intelligence committees knew about NSA collections against leaders in allied countries.