The New Republic

With Senator John McCain’s increasing propensity to drop new
policy proposals into debates with little explanation, it is worth asking what
he meant when he urged viewers to “watch
Ukraine.” As it turns out, Ukraine
is once again in the middle of a nasty
domestic political crisis, this time pitting two former allies from the Orange
Revolution--Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and President Viktor Yushchenko--against
one another, with the most likely outcome being yet another early parliamentary
election. But as much as I personally would applaud either of the U.S.
presidential candidates for encouraging Americans to pay more attention to
domestic politics in Ukraine (or any post-communist country for that matter), I
don’t think this is exactly what Senator McCain had in mind.

Instead, Senator McCain was likely advancing a line of
reasoning that has become popular in
the press following this summer’s Russian-Georgian conflict. Simply put,
there is a growing tendency to invoke the Munich
analogy from World War II in reference to Russia’s
invasion of Georgia.
The argument here is that, like Germany
in the 1930s, Russia
is in the beginning stages of attempting to expand (or in this case
reestablish) its empire by invading, dismembering, and eventually annexing
territory from their neighbors. If the invasion of Georgia was a first step in this
regard, then it is logical to ask what the next step will be.

This is where Ukraine,
and in particular the Ukrainian province
of Crimea (which McCain name-dropped during the
debate), enters the picture. Crimea has
three characteristics that make it a particularly attractive option as a next
step for Russian aggression. First, the Russian Black Sea Fleet is still
located in the Crimean city of Sevastopol,
based on a lease that currently runs through 2017. Second, ethnic Russians make
up a majority of the population of Crimea. Finally,
and somewhat ominously, there are rumors that Russians have been increasing the
rate at which they have been giving
Russian passports to ethnic Russians in Crimea, a tactic that was employed
previously in the Georgian case. Thus, one posited scenario is for an “atrocity”
against ethnic Russians in Crimea to be manufactured,
requiring Russian armed intervention in response.

These points notwithstanding, an invasion of Ukraine by Russia remains very unlikely in the
near future for a whole host of reasons. First and foremost, an armed conflict
between Russia and Ukraine would likely be a different affair from the one
between Russia and Georgia by orders of magnitude; one expert on the Russian
military responded to my query by estimating that if the Georgian military was
a 1 and the Russian military a 10 on a 1-10 scale, the Ukrainian military would
be about a 5 or a 6. Second, Russia
has plenty of its own troubles to deal with at the moment in the wake of the
global financial crisis. This particular factor will be greatly exacerbated if
the price of oil--which has provided a great deal of the backbone to Russia’s newly
aggressive foreign policy tactics--continues to fall. Third, Russia paid a heavy price for its invasion of Georgia,
including international condemnation, the flight of foreign capital from
Russian markets, and even encouragement of separatists
within its own borders. Finally, Russia
still hopes to extend the lease of the Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol
beyond 2017, and any armed conflict with Ukraine
that did not result in a complete annexation of Crimea
would essentially end that possibility.

Moreover, the Munich
analogy is not the only way to interpret the Russian-Georgian conflict. Another
way to see the Russian incursion into Georgia was as an attempt
to send a signal to both its neighbors and the West that there would be
serious consequences for countries that Russia considered to be in its sphere
of influence should they continue to pursue pro-Western policies and, probably
most seriously, NATO membership. While this does not in any way make the
invasion of Georgia
more justifiable, it does suggest that the Georgian invasion may have
accomplished a goal of Russian foreign policy in and of itself, and is not
necessarily part of a broader policy of territorial expansion fueled by
military conflict. The speed at which Russia
rebuffed the suggestion by South Ossetian president Eduard Kokoity that
South Ossetia (one of the two Georgian breakaway republics) ought to join Russia is
certainly consistent with this vision of the invasion. Before anyone accuses me
of being naïve, I want to be clear that it is of course much too early to know
whether the Munich
analogy is correct. It is, however, important to realize that there are
alternative explanations for the invasion of Georgia
that do not immediately give rise to a forthcoming invasion of Ukraine. (It is
also worth noting that if one accepts this kind of a signaling perspective as a
good explanation for the Russian-Georgian conflict, then extending NATO
membership to Ukraine
would probably have the effect of making a potential Russian-Ukrainian conflict
more likely.)

The bottom line is that, while we certainly cannot rule out
any future actions on the part of the Russian armed forces, by far the most
likely outlet for this use of force was in Georgia--and this has already
occurred. While our government should of course be preparing contingency plans
in case any such conflict might break out, it remains highly unlikely in the
near to medium future. This is not any way to suggest that Russia is not currently trying--and will not in the
future try--to meddle in the domestic politics of Ukraine in an effort to influence
developments there in its favor. But at a time when the United States has many pressing foreign policy
concerns--including the global economic crisis, the war in Iraq, and the ongoing struggle with Al Qaeda--preparing
for a Russian invasion of Ukraine
is probably not one that most voters should feel compelled at the moment to
“watch.”

Is there anything useful then to learn about Senator McCain
from his decision to give Ukraine
prime-time attention? While on the surface this is probably just a small part
of an overall strategy to seem ready and willing to stand up to the bad guys
out there in the world, it does suggest that he subscribes to the Munich
analogy in terms of his understanding of the Russian-Georgian conflict, which
may or may not be a desired characteristic in a presidential candidate. As a
result, despite some of his claims to want to foster cooperation with Russia, he will most likely approach future
interactions with Russia
through a world-view that stresses the importance of standing up to Russia, which
in many cases may mean conflict. Whether avoiding conflict with Russia in
future years is possible (or even desirable) in any case remains an open
question, but a McCain presidency would certainly seem to make it less likely.

Joshua A. Tucker is an
associate professor of politics in the Wilf Family Department of Politics at New
York University and a National Security Fellow at the Truman National Security
Project.

By Joshua A. Tucker

share this article on facebook or twitter print this article