What should we do about the NSA? Should we do anything at all? These question are on the forefront these days.
For the past two weeks, Security States has been exploring the possibility of liability for software design flaws. It’s a critical issue—and likely the right answer from an economic perspective. But at this point that answer is theoretical. There are many steps between where we are today (no liability for any cyber breach) and there (product liability for software defects).
Behind pervasive data collection lurks a question most of us are asking – does it really matter?
Is America at risk from a counter-strike by Syria if it launched a military attack against Syria's chemical weapons? Yes – but not in the traditional way. A Syrian response would likely be of a different, asymmetric cyber form. And that’s a whole new way of thinking about war and contingencies.
For the past several weeks American leaders have been considering a military strike in Syria (a possibility that seems to have faded in recent days). Lurking behind the controversy and debate about whether that sort of strike would be good policy is a problem that must be driving military planners to distraction – America is no longer immune. Any decision to launch missiles at Syrian chemical weapons targets must incorporate an answer to the question – what will Syria do in response?