THE STUMP MAY 23, 2012
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Since news broke about JP Morgan’s multi-billion dollar black eye a few weeks back, we’ve pretty thoroughly rehearsed the arguments against too big to fail and too big to manage, both of which apply to JP Morgan even more obviously now than they did beforehand. This morning, a former administration official well-versed in these matters suggested another indication of JP Morgan’s excessive girth: too big to hedge. The idea takes Jamie Dimon’s logic—that he needs to be able to protect against the credit risk in his portfolio—and turns it on its head, since one of JP Morgan’s problems was that the trades it used for hedging were so large they moved the market. Everyone on Wall Street and in London could see what it was up to with this particular hedge and was able to punish it by taking the other side of the trade. As a general rule, I’d say that any time you’re so big your hedges invite talk of whales, it’s a good sign you’re too damn big.
Now, having said that, it’s hardly the case that hedging issues are the only reason we should want to keep banks nice and svelte. A bank could figure out how to hedge judiciously and still be too big to fail and too big to manage. (One tip for pulling this off: Don’t make the unit that’s responsible for hedging its own profit center, creating incentives for your “hedgers” to take preposterous risks when they’re supposed to be shielding you against them.) But the too big to hedge concept is nonetheless appealing because it makes clear how achieving “mega” scale isn’t just a problem for the rest of us, it’s not even in the megabank’s self-interest.
Follow me on twitter: @noamscheiber
2 comments
How about making any "hedging," whether profit center or not, operate with its own capital as a lateral subsidiary of a parent bank holding company -- with absolutely no access to the capital of the bank or the parent under any circumstances whatsoever, a legal bar against any claim on any basis being made against their assets other then the book capital of the hedge subsidiary. And no credit extension or other flow of funds from the bank to the hedging entity permitted. That way, the parent has a hedged position, owning both the bank and the hedge, but the bank itself is immune. Then keep the bank's leverage under control, including on its balance sheet all implied assets and liabilities, guarantees, the works. The market can assess the creditworthiness of the hedge subsidiary and decide how large a position it should be allowed to have. Some real moral risk, not on the back of the taxpayers.
- roidubouloi
May 23, 2012 at 2:33pm
I'm just happy I'm not getting an earful about how Bill Daley worked for JPMC and therefore the Obama administration tried to bilk the American public with another Solyndra situation. But then again, I'm not that deep into the right-wing crazy rumour mill, where these allegations (and Vincent Foster!) are likely percolating.
- chaitless
May 23, 2012 at 2:52pm