There are only 3 cases in which a nation can use force against another nation. Does this pass that test?
Fighting terrorism requires more than targeting leaders
Editor’s Note: Terrorist groups typically rely on tried and true tactics such as shootings, bombings, and of course suicide attacks. These and a handful of other methods represent the vast majority of terrorist attacks as many groups are loath to risk failure by trying something new. Because defenses focus on foiling these tactics, innovation can be tremendously effective, allowing a terrorist group to kill more people, grab headlines around the world, or otherwise advance its cause.
It was his best speech on national security, but it will not quell the controversies.
This presumably was not the report Obama was imagining when created the group.
The U.S. government has never prosecuted a newspaper or journalist for publishing classified information, and in recent years even the theoretical legal possibility of doing so has evaporated.
By imagining that the statute provides more protection than it does, the FISC’s opinion ends up approving a program that Congress did not contemplate.
And other national-security debates in these three podcasts
On October 25, the Hoover Institution put together a media colloquium which brought together a group of distinguished journalists who work on national security issues and put them face to face for a day with members of its Jean Perkins Task Force on National Security and Law.
FISA Reform on Capitol Hill
The below is the final installment in a five-part series. Part 1 explored the problems stemming from our collective unwillingness to hold software providers accountable for vulnerability-ridden code. Part 2 argued that the technical challenges associated with minimizing software vulnerabilities weigh in favor of, not against, imposing liability on software makers.
This is the fourth installment in a series on whether and how to hold software makers financially liable for the insecurity of their products. Part I offered an overview of the problem of insecure code. Part II countered the notion that the technical challenges associated with minimizing software vulnerabilities weigh against the creation of any kind of maker-liability regime.