POLITICS MAY 24, 2012
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Europe’s Greek tragedy has now entered its final act, with potentially fateful consequences for the global economy—and for Barack Obama, whose reelection may hinge on the decisions of Germany in the coming weeks. The 2012 election will pivot on the public’s evaluation of the president’s economic stewardship, and a perceptible decline in the U.S. growth rate—which a badly handled Greek exit from the Eurozone would cause—could easily spell the difference between victory and defeat. Obama’s fate, then, may well lie in Angela Merkel’s hands. That doesn’t mean, though, that there’s nothing he can do about it.
What are the economic stakes? Mark Cliffe, ING’s head of Financial Markets Research, has conducted the most detailed analysis that I know of. He examines two scenarios—a Greek exit from a Eurozone that remains intact, and an exit that triggers a complete collapse of the European monetary union. The consequences of the latter would be catastrophic. In the first year alone, Eurozone GDP would fall by 9 percent. Inflation in the “peripheral economies” such as Spain and Portugal would head toward double digits, while the Eurozone core—especially Germany—would suffer a “deflationary shock.” Because the dollar would surge in relation to whatever national currencies might emerge, the United States would undergo that shock as well, and the exchange-rate jolt to U.S. competitiveness would reduce the odds of a sustained recovery in U.S. exports—a cornerstone of Obama’s growth strategy.
The consequences of a Greek exit considered in isolation would be less serious, of course. Even so, they are not pretty. Cliffe projects that the Eurozone would undergo a major recession and experience significantly higher levels of unemployment. In the United States, GDP growth would slow to only 1.3 percent in 2012 and 1.7 percent in 2013. Unemployment would stop falling and stagnate at current levels for the remainder of this year. These developments would make it harder for Obama to argue that we’re heading in the right direction, and—based on my analysis of recent elections involving incumbents—I suspect that economic growth at these depressed levels would mean victory for Mitt Romney.
From the American standpoint, the best outcome is concerted European action to keep Greece within the fold, while the second best outcome is a strategy that delays the inevitable until Europe can strengthen its defenses against contagion.
But there’s a problem: Many key European officials and observers have concluded that a Greek exit is both inevitable and manageable. A lengthy article in Der Spiegel makes this case, going so far as to argue that the consequences of doing what would be necessary to keep Greece in the monetary union would be worse than allowing it to leave. And Germany’s powerful Bundesbank agrees. Its most recent monthly report states: “A significant dilution of existing agreements [concerning Greece] would damage confidence in all euro area agreements and treaties and strongly weaken incentives for national reform.” Crucially, Germany’s central bank has concluded that Europe could successful deal with a Greek exit: “The challenges this would create for the euro area and for Germany would be considerable but manageable given prudent crisis management.”
To be sure, many other leaders—especially in France and Italy—are far more concerned about Europe’s ability to contain the consequences of Greece’s departure. France’s new president, Francois Hollande, is pushing the European Central Bank to provide further liquidity and intervene in sovereign debt markets. But the stark fact is that right now these leaders’ views don’t matter all that much. Angela Merkel, Germany’s new iron chancellor, holds the veto, and she appears unyielding. And (it must be said) German opinion from top to bottom seems driven by the tale of the ant and the grasshopper. Germany’s success in no accident, Germans believe. A thrifty, disciplined people bit the bullet and made the painful structural adjustments that long-term prosperity requires. Now it’s time for others to follow suit.
Until now, the ability of the United States to influence Eurozone policy has been modest, and many of our efforts to do so have produced resentment. So what is President Obama to do? If he believes, as I think he should, that the global economy, U.S. economy, and his own electoral prospects all hang in the balance, then he should call Merkel and propose a quick summit between the two leaders and their respective economic teams. He should come armed with a menu of concrete steps that the United States and major international institutions would be willing to take if Germany were to change course. He should appeal to Germany’s self-interest as the major beneficiary of the expanded export market the Eurozone has created. He should remind Merkel of the sacrifices that the United States made over many decades to help build a Europe that is free, whole, and united. And he should make it clear in private, and announce in public, that from the American standpoint, what touches all concerns all: Chancellor Merkel is not free to proceed as though the current crisis affects only Germany (or Europe) and the rest of the world has no legitimate say in the outcome.
Granted, this would be a bold and risky step. There’s no guarantee of success, and it would surely strain ties between the United States and one of its most important allies. Obama could return empty-handed, resulting in a diplomatic catastrophe. But the alternative is worse—to stand by while the dominant European country allows short-term politics, nationalist myopia, and misplaced moralism to substitute for far-sighted statesmanship that promotes a broader good.
William Galston is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution an a contributing editor for The New Republic.
16 comments
Typical hand-wringing baloney from Galston. Does he realize that the election is hardly more than five months away? The Euro could fail tomorrow and it would still be later than November before Americans felt the pain. To be sure, what's happening in Europe right now is hugely important to America and to individual Americans, but not to the election. Obama will win or lose (win, I predict) on the back of economic events and decisions that took place two years ago and more and on voters' perceptions of him personally.
- AaronW
May 24, 2012 at 3:33am
Excellent point Aaron. This is all about lead time--the real effects of Bush policies are still being felt, and the real effects of Obama's only began to unfold a year or so ago. At the end of the day the euro is an unsustainable nonsense, typical of the idealistic socialist fantasy that imagines everyone joining hands and living happily ever after by following rules dreamed up by unaccountable people no one has ever heard of, much less elected, in Frankfurt and Brussels. The sooner Europeans stop dreaming and confront the reality that you can't have authority without responsibility, and that unenforceable rules are no rules at all, the better for all concerned.
- Robert Powell
May 24, 2012 at 5:03am
Aaron. Tipping-point moments do occur and EU failure could be one of those moments that produce a crisis. Google Lehman Bros... or Krugman on Wile E Coyote economic moments -- and EU failure. However, re Galston's advice for BHO and Merkel-- what exactly is BHO to advise Merkel to do re an EU stimulus (that she abhores) and subsequent stimulushelp from the US???... BHO has proposed inadequate stimuli for the US that he has zero chances of getting through the House or Senate. Sorry guys, BHO, the Dems, and the EU are now stuck with terrible decisions vthey made two years ago--- and neither BHO nor Merkel have the personalities bor the policies to effectively change course.
- drofnats1
May 24, 2012 at 7:46am
The short-term political consequences in the US is what Galston is really addressing (whether failure of the Eurozone is good or bad for Greece and the other southern zone countries is debatable). But I'm not sure the high stakes gamble he is proposing would pay off. First, I cannot imagine the Germans, the Germans, ever accepting Obama's proposal; why should they, Obama's political future is in doubt, and Romney is likely to give Merkel and Germany unconditional support; does anybody believe Romney has any sympathy for Greece and the other profligate southern zone countries. Second, even if Merkel were receptive, the Republicans would block anything that might give Obama or the Eurozone a boost, even if it would help avoid economic (and perhaps political) catastrophe in Europe. Third, this is complex stuff, and I imagine few American voters have a clue about how the Eurozone works (or even what the Eurozone is), or how Germany has profited at the expense of other Eurozone countries by being a net exporter to them; and Obama would have better success teaching Americans about physics than about the Eurozone. Finally, high stakes summits always fail, even when they succeed in the long run; and the long run does Obama no political good. On the other hand, a high stakes summit concerning something Americans really care about could help save Obama; something like American Idol or the National Football League.
- rayward
May 24, 2012 at 8:12am
But ray, how are the short-term effects of the Euro-flu going to adversely affect Obama's electoral prospects. Unless the electorate is feeling real economic pain as a result--and I submit in the near term there will not be any such pain--it means zilch. Sure, the markets might tank, but the voters aren't moved by the markets; they're moved by payroll.
- AaronW
May 24, 2012 at 8:47am
"...-to stand by while the dominant European country allows short-term politics, nationalist myopia, and misplaced moralism to substitute for far-sighted statesmanship that promotes a broader good." If everyone at TNR holds the title of editor, how is it that such drivel gets published. It is painfully clear from the article that it is Galston who is most concerned about the short term. The reason why Germany is so hostile to implementation of a more socialized fiscal structure, such as eurobonds, isn't because they are indulging a simplistic ant/grasshoper morality tale; it is because they are the only adults in the room. Quite contrary to Galston's accusations, it is they who are looking long term. If the current pressures are insufficient to implement the necessary reforms to achieve balance between consumption and productivity along the periphery, then relief through issuance of eurobonds only delays the reckoning to a later time in which the european debt burden will be augmented by eurobonds. Eurobonds can responsibly lessen the pain in the short term only if real growth measures are being implemented. The reality is that when reforms are implemented, a good chunk of the periphery strikes and GDP continues to decline. There is no euro solution if this behavior persists. Germany's economists undestand this. Galston can't see past November 2012.
- jkodak
May 24, 2012 at 9:30am
jkodak. I see you, like Merkel and the Repubs, reject Keynesian theories of economics- unaware that economics is an emerging science and Keynesian theories are the only ones that fit the data in liquidity trap conditions. Your position is as valid -- and likely to be as successful-- as that of Urban VIII in 1612 who rejected data and theories of a heliocentric universe. He and his aliies had the power to insist on invalid theories as an ideology for a few more years-- but ended up in the dustbin of History. My guess is you've never heard of Urban VIII -- ever heard of Gilileo??
- drofnats1
May 24, 2012 at 11:22am
drognats1, Attitude is no substitute for argument. In fact, I embrace Keynes. I understand him to advocate the use of stimulus under certain conditions, such as preventing a long term supply side contraction by using government spending to combat an irrational contraction in demand. His theory is not "just fill the frickin' hole." The problem isn't Keynes, it's your cartoonish view of Keynes. The Germans undoubtedly understand the good of greater stimulus, they doubt any pump priming potential and they are probably right.
- jkodak
May 24, 2012 at 12:42pm
jk. You may embrace Keynes, you don't understand him or Keynesian economics.
- drofnats1
May 24, 2012 at 1:50pm
I have a slightly more expansive read of Keynesian theory than jkodak, but he's spot on that if the German's can't get other countries to agree to obviously necessary reforms right now, all the stimulus in the world is somewhat moot. As it's very difficult to see any agreeing on painful reforms once the situation improves somewhat (or at least, becomes less immediately dire). One thing that appears to receive scant consideration is the possibility that the Germans have decided that Greece needs to leave the Euro, whether in a controlled or otherwise fashion. There are clearly some nasty implications to this, but one assumes that the Germans have considered this and decided they are preferable to a great sucking sound to the south. Lets try an analogy - would New York, California and a non-trivial number of "blue" states (that sent more to Washington than then they receive) want to stay in a union if all the red states they support weren't constrained by needing to balance their budgets? Taxes in the right-to-work states could be pretty low if you think about it, deficits be damned.
- Nari224
May 24, 2012 at 1:55pm
What you are recommending sounds an awful lot like John McCain suspending his campaign due to the economic crisis in 2008, then un-suspending it.
- floydsm8
May 24, 2012 at 2:55pm
nari.. What obviously necessary reforms? A greater contraction of the Greek economy?? Who knows what the Germans and most EU politicians and bankers understand about Keynesian economics? Either they dont understand Keynesian economics or they do understand and nevertheless do the opposite, which is worse.. I give them and you and jk the benefit of the doubt, and assume the former.
- drofnats1
May 24, 2012 at 4:50pm
Please read any of a set of Keynesian evconomic analyses by Krugman, DeLong, and others. Given past errors, the only way to save the Euro with Greece as a member (and probably Spain, Italy and Portugal to follow) at this point is for the EU inflation target to be set much higher (say 4-5%) and massive aid to be given to Greece (and probably Spain, Italy and Portugal to follow). In the absence of that, by far the best option for Greece (and the others) is to have their own currency that they can devalue as needed-- and repudiate debts as needed. Contrary to popular belief, that approach works--- Google Argentina. And Germany will almost-certainly be much worse off than if Angela had not gone anti-Keynesian from the get go.
- drofnats1
May 24, 2012 at 5:02pm
dro - I think we're talking about different things. I'm talking about reforms to the Maastricht Treaty (or it's subsequently amended forms) that creates a currency union with rules but without penalties or enforcement mechanisms. Hence my analogy to the US, where each state can use the dollar but has to balance its budget each year, and only the Federal government has control over fiscal and monetary policy for the dollar. There are no such restrictions in the Euro, so the Germans find themselves in the situation where they are viewed as the guarantor of last resort, and frankly, they don't want to be if the other nations won't play by their rules. Especially since others (Greece!) got to party like they were Germans (or rather, could borrow like they were) and Germany didn't so indulge (yes, their surplus is everyone else's deficit, but that's somewhat irrelevant to the immediate picture). And given the large number of automatic stabilizers inherent in the Germany economy, they may understand Keynes perfectly well, just in a different form to you and I, which largely is a function of their vs. our history. They view the Greeks (and Spaniards and Italians) as having lied on their membership form which is why I rather suspect they'd rather see at least the Greeks go, and if it's a great big mess, they may view this as encouraging everyone else to sign on stricter rules. That's their long term concern; that they'll continue to be bailing everyone else out, or inflating their currency or any number of other things they'd much rather not do. Clearly it's not in Germany's interest to be one strong economy surrounded by failed ones, but they presumably don't believe that even a disorderly Greek default will inevitably result in that. Yes this is going to end in considerable pain for the Greeks with possibly dire consequences for the Greek state. Yes there are other things Germany / the ECB could be doing. However if they've made their decision that if they can't get the changes they want at the moment, there's little hope of getting them in the future, and so their actions that appear to be rather precipitous make sense. I'm not saying I agree with the strategy, but I can see from whence it may have come.
- Nari224
May 24, 2012 at 6:54pm
drofnats1, Up until your last sentence, I thought you were just being intellectually lazy by calling any utterance you disagree with anti-Keynesian. Now I understand, you haven't a damn clue. "And Germany will almost-certainly be much worse off than if Angela had not gone anti-Keynesian from the get go." If a 230 billion euro bail-out to date, equal to just over 100% of Greek GDP is anti-Keynesian, what do you think would have been Keynesian? 200%? 300%? Just pull a number out of your ass and explain to us all why it and only it is Keynesian.
- jkodak
May 24, 2012 at 7:27pm
I think Nari and jkodak state it very well. There is not enough money in the world, much less in Germany, to "stimulate" Greece and the others into a healthy economy without drastic reforms. The problem is political, not economic. It is simply not possible to turn Greece and Portugal into Germany by making unenforceable "rules" at the ECB. Unfortunately, to the steadily decreasing extent that Germany has any leverage at all to deal with the fundamental problem, it's in denying the funds needed to delay the inevitable. Greece is gone. The question is whether a fire-wall can be established around Spain and Italy.
- Robert Powell
May 25, 2012 at 5:11pm