POLITICS JULY 13, 2012
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IN THE WEEKS BEFORE the Supreme Court decided the fate of the Affordable Care Act, conservatives became increasingly worried that Chief Justice John Roberts was about to lose his nerve. The columnist George Will accused liberals of “put[ting] the squeeze” to Roberts, in the hope that he would “buckle beneath the pressure.” Fueling the hyperbole was a familiar fear: that Roberts would join the ranks of conservative apostates on the Court who have turned out to be less than ideologically pure.
Conservatives have long feared that Roberts might care too much about seeking common ground with liberal justices. While his political beliefs and judicial philosophy are conservative, Roberts employs a more conciliatory style than, say, Antonin Scalia. And unlike, for example, Clarence Thomas, who lives in a conservative social bubble, Roberts cares deeply about the Court’s image in the outside world.
And so, when Roberts indeed became the only conservative to join the four liberals in voting to uphold President Obama’s central legislative achievement, the right feared that its worst nightmare had come to pass. Howls of betrayal soon followed. National Review charged in an online editorial that Roberts had “done violence” to the Constitution. Marc Thiessen, writing in The Washington Post, attacked the chief justice for his “sophistry” and concluded that the right needs jurists with “the intestinal fortitude not to be swayed by pressure from The New York Times, the Georgetown cocktail circuit and the legal academy.”
Meanwhile, liberals found themselves in the unexpected position of applauding Roberts for his act of judicial statesmanship—unexpected because, in recent years, many on the left had cast Roberts as a radical bent on rewriting vast swathes of U.S. law. Now, the health care ruling had exposed for the first time a deep rift between Roberts and his conservative colleagues. Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Anthony Kennedy, and Samuel Alito had revealed their willingness to strike down much of the post–New Deal regulatory state; Roberts had wisely balked at the prospect. This startling break left observers of all political stripes wondering: Had John Roberts experienced a change of heart?
AT THE END OF ROBERTS’S first term as chief justice in July 2006, I interviewed him in his chambers at the Supreme Court. Our conversation, which I wrote about in an article for The Atlantic, was wide-ranging, but Roberts returned repeatedly to one theme: his desire to restore the bipartisan legitimacy of the Supreme Court.
In Roberts’s view, the Court was losing respect with the public because it issued too many rulings along partisan lines. “I do think the rule of law is threatened by a steady term-after-term focus on five–four decisions,” he said. “I think the Court is also ripe for a similar refocus on functioning as an institution,” he told me, “because if it doesn’t, it’s going to lose its credibility.”
Roberts said he had been inspired by the example of his greatest predecessor, John Marshall. “He could easily have got on the Court and said, ‘I’m the last hope of the Federalists: We’re out of Congress, we’re out of the White House, and I’m going to pursue that agenda here,’” he said. “But instead he said, ‘No, this is my home now, this is the Court, and we’re going to operate as a Court, and that’s important to me.’”
As we talked, it became clear that Roberts saw the promotion of consensus in service of the Court’s long-term interests as the greatest test of a successful chief justice. “I think judicial temperament is a willingness to step back from your own committed views of the correct jurisprudential approach and evaluate those views in terms of your role as a judge,” Roberts explained. “A justice is not like a law professor, who might say ‘This is my theory of this, and this is what I’m going to be faithful to and consistent with, and in twenty years we’ll look back and say, I had a consistent theory of the First Amendment as applied to a particular area,’” he said. “Coherence in the Court’s jurisprudence is more important than coherence in each individual justice’s jurisprudence.” He added, in a remark that now seems prescient, “I would like to think, looking back, that my opinions show a concern about the legitimacy of what we’re doing is an important part of the inquiry in each case.” The fact that Roberts was willing to defend the Court’s institutional legitimacy in the health care case confirms that he meant what he said.
His conservative colleagues, however, didn’t see it that way. In early July, three days after the health care decision was released, Jan Crawford of CBS News reported that Roberts had initially voted with the four conservatives to strike down the health care law but later switched sides. The conservatives were livid, according to Crawford, accusing Roberts of folding to liberal pressure and refusing to join even the parts of his opinions with which they agreed. In their dissent, Scalia and his colleagues made their anger plain. They sneered at the majority’s “feeble” arguments and ostentatiously referred to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s concurring opinion as a dissent, in order to draw attention to the vote switch. The fact that the story came to light was itself a sign of the conservatives’ deep sense of betrayal: Crawford attributed her report to “two sources with specific knowledge of the deliberations”—meaning either that the conservative justices or their clerks talked or that those with whom they discussed the case felt free to embarrass the chief justice on the conservatives’ behalf.
On the face of it, the conservatives’ extreme displeasure was hard to fathom, since Roberts’s so-called betrayal was only partial. While he voted to uphold the Affordable Care Act (ACA), he joined the conservatives in accepting the novel argument that health care reform was unconstitutional because Congress can only regulate economic activity, not economic inactivity—such as the failure to buy health insurance.
But perhaps the real reason for the conservatives’ anger was that Roberts had decided to protect the long-term institutional interests of the Court rather than embrace the conservative ideological agenda in its most radical dimensions. In their joint dissent, Scalia, Alito, Thomas, and Kennedy outed themselves as partisans of the Constitution in Exile—the movement of economic libertarians who want the courts to resurrect pre–New Deal limits on federal power in order to dismantle the regulatory state piece by piece. The four conservatives railed about the need for the courts to protect states’ rights and individual liberty—even if doing so meant overriding the wishes of the people’s representatives. “Article I contains no whatever-it-takes-to-solve-a-national-problem power,” the dissenters huffed, in a phrase that sounded like the handiwork of Justice Scalia.
Roberts refused to join them. Instead, he emphasized Congress’s broad powers to solve national problems and the importance of judicial deference to Congress’s policy choices. And even in his endorsement of the “economic inactivity” argument, there were important differences between his approach and that of the four conservatives. Roberts and Ginsburg both noted that mandates to purchase goods are extremely rare and Congress has never relied on the Commerce clause to justify them. Therefore, the Court’s opinion is unlikely to constrain national policy in practice—in the event that Congress wants to mandate the purchase of any product in the future, it can now do so by invoking its taxing power. By contrast, the four conservatives embraced an even narrower interpretation of the Commerce clause and the taxing power. Justice Ginsburg’s powerful dissent on this point accused them of having embraced a “stunningly retrogressive” reading of the Commerce clause, threatening the return of an “era in which the Court routinely thwarted Congress’s efforts to regulate the national economy.”
Roberts also parted ways with his fellow conservatives over the question of Congress’s spending authority. In one of the more convoluted sections of the ruling, seven justices found that the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid was unconstitutionally coercive, because states that refused to participate would lose all their federal Medicaid funding, amounting to more than 10 percent of their entire budgets. However, Roberts and the liberals allowed the Medicaid expansion to stand by making a pragmatic fix—they simply prevented the government from threatening to withhold existing Medicaid funds. The four conservatives would have struck down the entire expansion, using logic that would call into question the constitutionality of many federal grants that impose conditions on the states, not to mention Medicaid itself.
For all the drama surrounding Roberts’s decision in the health care case, it was entirely consistent with his behavior since he joined the Court. His worldview is conservative, and he votes with the conservatives more often than not. But he has never joined them in embracing the most radical form of the Constitution in Exile. He generally favors narrow rulings over broad ones when possible, and prefers to chip away at precedents incrementally rather than to overturn them cleanly. (Justice Scalia scoffed at this incrementalism as “faux judicial restraint.”) He is willing to embrace “saving constructions” of laws in the spirit of John Marshall (Thomas Jefferson, Marshall’s archrival, derisively called them “twistifications”) in order to avoid striking down federal laws, as he did in the 2009 case upholding the Voting Rights Act. Yet, when Roberts believes that no such twistifications are possible, he enforces constitutional principles he cares about in sweeping terms, as he did in the Seattle affirmative action case that outlawed a program to integrate city schools.
All of these instincts converged in the health care case, in which Roberts set aside his ideological preference to protect the Court from a decision along party lines that would have imperiled its legitimacy. After initially siding with the conservatives, Roberts tried to persuade his liberal and conservative colleagues to converge around a result that would avoid a sweeping 5–4 ruling along party lines, according to Crawford. When that proved impossible, he chose the least disruptive path, upholding the mandate by finding that it was within Congress’s taxing power. The decision revealed the chief justice as a master strategist with a nuanced concern for institutional integrity that is less dramatic or nefarious than the characterizations advanced by partisans on the left or the right. But grasping these nuances is crucial to understanding how Roberts is shaping the Court.
WHAT DOES ALL THIS mean for the next term and beyond? The rift between Roberts and the other conservatives will most likely be repaired. The conservatives need his vote too urgently to maintain their temper tantrums for very long. And the liberal victory in the health care case may come at a high price, since Roberts now has the bipartisan cover to reassert his conservative credentials. He may not be an ideologue like Scalia or Thomas, but he has strong views on certain issues—such as the color-blind Constitution and the importance of protecting business interests against regulation by litigation. His health care votes may embolden him to join the conservatives in striking down not only affirmative action and the Voting Rights Act next year, but in enforcing other limits on federal power in the future.
Whether Roberts forgets the sniping of his colleagues is another matter. But with his deft performance in the health care case, Roberts made the Court his own in a way of which Marshall would have approved. Like Marshall, Roberts means to act strategically, over decades, always looking ahead and biding his time.
Jeffrey Rosen is the Legal Affairs Editor of The New Republic. This article appeared in the August 2, 2012 issue of the magazine.
18 comments
Of course, Rosen could have written this summation a month ago (even the small part of Ms. Crawford). On the other hand, there's something disconcerting about people behaving in very predictable ways, especially for experts in the prediction business.
- rayward
July 12, 2012 at 9:27pm
Not really, Ray. The obvious point of this piece is that Roberts's behavior now is consistent with his past behavior and statements. But if Robert subverted differently on ACA then did, it would've completely invalidated Rosen's argument. Thus he could not have written it a month ago.
- AaronW
July 12, 2012 at 11:03pm
"Appears in August 2 issue of this magazine" -- what the ? Anyway, Roberts is doing his job. He deserves a promotion. Has any Supreme ever run for POTUS? It's not too late to lighten the GOP load before that ship goes down with all hands.
- skahn
July 12, 2012 at 11:06pm
But this does not mean that Roberts is non-ideological or that he is truly a judicial conservative. He is not irresponsible – as are Scalia and Thomas – and therefore wants to move the law to the right “incrementally” so that he can preserve the Court’s veneer of legitimacy. But lost in the excitement about his vote to uphold the ACA is the fact that he nevertheless engaged in judicial overreach by deciding the issue of whether the ACA could be upheld under the Commerce Clause. Under conservative judicial philosophy, he should not have reached a constitutional issue that need not be decided in order to decide the case. Ginsburg challenged him about that, and his excuse was lame. He said something to the effect that had to reach the Commerce Clause issue because, in order to uphold the ACA under the taxing power, he had to read the statutory language of the mandate in a way that was reasonable but was not the most natural reading of it. Huh? And then, of course, in the portion of the opinion addressing the Commerce Clause, he engaged in sophistry in arguing that the mandate was not sustainable under the Commerce Clause, perhaps paving the way for mischief down the road. Dhurtado
- NR143296
July 13, 2012 at 9:16am
Am I the only person who actually agrees with Roberts' decision? There is something very disconcerting about the government 'mandating' that everyone engage in a comercial activity, even if one can presume that sooner or later everyone does engage in that activity. (I can bet there are many people who just never go to a doctor, no matter what, and to make them shell out extra taxes because they do not go to doctors seems somewhat harsh. Like some of the supremes, I would have preferred forcing them to buy insurance plus a penalty if and when they actually went to a doctor, even if this seems cruel. They wouldn't have to cough up cash while bleeding on the threshold, but they would get socked with a bill.) However, Congress is tasked with providing for the common good and allowed to collect taxes for that purpose. Just because Congress was afraid to call the penalty a tax doesn't make the penalty not a tax, especially since enforcement is through the IRS. What I don't quite understand is the ruling on Medicaid. That does seem to be the Supreme Court dictating to Congress what is can and cannot do, unless the ruling has something to do with contracts???
- polijunky
July 13, 2012 at 10:08am
Polijunky “There is something very disconcerting about the government 'mandating' that everyone engage in a comercial activity, even if one can presume that sooner or later everyone does engage in that activity. (I can bet there are many people who just never go to a doctor, no matter what, and to make them shell out extra taxes because they do not go to doctors seems somewhat harsh.” Not sooner, or later, Poli, in a democratic free market system we all engage in commerce all the time. You do this from birth to death. Babies don’t get born by themselves; most children will see one or more doctors while growing up. In all aspects of one’s life you are buying or bartering something or other. The issue isn’t, engage in commerce or not engage in commerce, the issue who pays for such activities. In medicine people without health insurance end up in emergency rooms and taxpayers end up paying for more expensive treatment. (The number of people today who never see a doctor is very tiny, if they exist at all.) Hence the government isn’t mandating that “everyone engage in a commercial activity,” it merely assumes that we all do and is asking people who do not wish to buy health insurance to pay a kind of insurance tax so that when they do need medical care other will not have to pay for them.
- arnon1
July 13, 2012 at 10:44am
Jeffrey Rosen has consistently overrated Roberts's judicial restraint, dating back to before his nomination to the Court. Significantly, Rosen makes no reference to Roberts's blatant overreaching to achieve a radical result in the horrendous Citizens United case, the consequences of which we now living with in the current election cycle. Roberts may not be quite as extreme as Scalia, Thomas, and Alito (neither is Kennedy), but he is bad enough to be dangerous.
- mg1977
July 13, 2012 at 11:39am
I agree with mg, re: Citizens' United. Roberts may not be as crude or extreme as some others, but the Citizens' United ruling, which he supported, was egregious, extreme, based on an overreaching and ideological reading of the 1st amendment, and is already having horrible consequences. Best not to forget that.
- Curran1
July 13, 2012 at 12:44pm
Any judge who uses a case to further their own agenda should disqualify himself or herself for having a stake in the outcome of the case. The mere evidence of anger by the conservatives at Roberts says everything about their neutral dispassionate mindset about the cases before them. And, of course, that is after telling the country in confirmation hearings that they can't comment on a case that might come before them because blah blah blah and blah blah blah.
- Nusholtz
July 13, 2012 at 1:52pm
Justice Roberts's logic on Obamacare does sound a bit like what Jefferson called "twistification." On the other hand, his goal of restoring bipartisanship to the Supreme Court is surely a worthy goal. He may also have been exhibiting genuine judicial restraint. As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once wrote in a letter to Felix Frankfurter, he did not think the Supreme Court could always undo mistakes made by Congress by declaring bad laws unconstitutional. That said, if we are to have a truly free and open society, we need to do away with racial and other quotas and favoritism. If Roberts joins the other conservatives on the court and declares affirmative action unconstitutional, that would be a very good thing.
- Spengler47
July 13, 2012 at 2:36pm
Get a room, for Pete's sake. Roberts' opinion was a travesty, and also an opportunistic coup making him the one to see for swing votes, which he is willing to give without regard to principle, replacing in that role the poor benighted, over-emotional Anthony Kennedy. Roberts' opinion stated all (or most) of the right reasons for upholding the ACA under the Commerce Clause, not under the government's taxing power, which has nothing to do with it. But he kept his skirts clean for future aribrtrary Commerce Clause decisions, while producing another of those 5-4 decisions he professes to deplore. The ruling on Medicaid expansion was even more bizarre, a bit of intellectual game-playing at the expense of some of the poorest Americans for whom the ACA was primarily designed. If striking down the Medicaid provision altogether would have called many Federal grant conditions into question, so even more does the irrational legislation by the Court to excise the conditions it considers "coercive." Which amendment is that? This decision cuts the guts out of a vitally needed ACA provision and is nothing but a power grab on the part of the Court and even more on the part of the chief justice. P.S. Roberts' John Marshall-like "twistification" in the 2009 voting rights case was actually an instance of his weaseling out of a hole he had dug for himself when he couldn't get the votes to use a flimsy water-district complaint to blow up the VRA's pre-clearance provision. The "saving construction" he employed was completely bogus, as I recall, the kind of thing only a chief justice can get away with.
- mlottman
July 13, 2012 at 4:32pm
“As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once wrote in a letter to Felix Frankfurter, he did not think the Supreme Court could always undo mistakes made by Congress by declaring bad laws unconstitutional.” I’m not sure that’s precisely what Holmes said, Spengler, but the Court should NEVER declare a law unconstitutional because the Court thinks it is a bad law. NEVER, EVER. That’s not to say the Court has not done that, over and over again, but it does not have the constitutional authority to do so. With regard to “twistification,” that’s what Roberts did in the Commerce Clause portion of his opinion. His reasoning in the tax-power portion of the opinion was sound and straightforward. The idea it at affirmative action prevents our society from being a free and open one is ludicrous. As to the constitutionality of affirmative action programs, did you know that the same Congress that passed the 14th Amendment established programs that would be regarded as “affirmative action” in contemporary parlance? Dhurtado
- NR143296
July 14, 2012 at 12:44am
The idea THAT ...
- NR143296
July 14, 2012 at 12:46am
I thought Roberts was right and Ginsburg was wrong on whether he had to consider the commerce clause before he held the ACA mandate could be upheld under the taxing power. The reason is that his tax reasoning only arose because the mandate failed under the commerce power according to 5 judges. The tax power issue wasn't a straightforward question: is the payment requirement a tax. The issue was rather: now that mandate is not legal on the primary ground asserted for it--the commerce power--is it "fairly possible" to read the requirement as a tax in order to save its consitutionsality, even if that's not the most likely reading of it. The precise legal context of the taxing power issue, in other words, was a constitutional rescue mission neccesitated by the failure of the commerce power justification of the mandate. By its very nature that exercise presupposes the failure of the main ground, just as Verrilli framed the taxing power point as his alternate ground.
- basman
July 14, 2012 at 1:35am
But there is a critical distinction, basman, between the analytical process the Court goes through in determining how it will decide a case, on the one hand, and the holdings that it actually issues, on the other hand. You are correct that, in the process of trying to find a way to uphold a congressional enactment, the Court would have to consider all of the possible bases for upholding the enactment, including, in this case, the Commerce Clause. But once the majority concluded that the ACA could be upheld under taxing power and that it would uphold the ACA on that basis, it had no business “holding” that it could not be upheld under the Commerce Clause. In accordance with traditional canons of constitutional interpretation, the Court should not have publicly reached that issue at all. Dhurtado
- NR143296
July 14, 2012 at 10:36am
You can't read Jeffrey Toobin's New Yorker article on the tortuous case of Citizens United without thinking that Roberts really needed to act against type. I mean, there was nothing about Citizens United that was incremental: they overruled 100 years of precedent. The Montana case showed that he held his ground there. I now understand his hysterical reaction after witnessing oral arguments. To someone who was doing the research he was doing, it sure looked like Roberts was going to lead the court into a summary overruling, and he was still trying to dredge up Souter's secret memo that aired out the court's dirty laundry. I still can't wait for open season reporting on this stuff to commence, though.
- chaitless
July 14, 2012 at 10:50am
Well, my relatively uninformed opinion is that Roberts -- unlike Scalia, Alito and Thomas -- recognizes that there are certain lines that cannot be crossed without seriously jeopardizing the legitimacy of the Court, and perhaps undermining his ultimate agenda. He was not willing to invalidate Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in its entirety -- at least not yet -- and he was not willing to invalidte the ACA in its entirety, which his conservative colleagues on the Court apparently wanted to do. But he was nevertheless "activist" in reaching the Commerce Clause issue, when, under principles of judicial conservatism, he shouldn't have. Dhurtado
- NR143296
July 14, 2012 at 11:48am
DH, I understand the point you make and the distinction you draw, but the sheer logic of your position aside, it seems to me that given the administration's primacy in tfhe the assertion of the commerce power, including its intense political characterization of the mandate as not being a tax, given the lower courts' turmoil over the issue with circuit courts going different ways and with dissenting opinions even within specific decisions, and given the intense public interest in the issue for almost two years now, it's hard to imagine the court not engaging the issue. I'd think, off the top of my head, without having addressed the issue, that the court's decision about and discretion over how to go about deciding a case, how to structure and frame its reasoning, trumps canons of construction. As well, I'm not aware if the issue is a straight forward question of whether the mandate is a tax, that necessarily gets answered affirmatively. In the analysis the court went through it was only a "fairly possible" reading of the mandate to characterize it as a tax. I could see, perversely, a court saying looking at the issue straight on it's not a tax, but looked at from the angle of going to all permissible lengths to save constutionality we can read it as a tax, in a consitutional pinch so to speak. The two questions seem to involve different analyses and one doesn't, it's seems to me anyway, reach the second question without determining the first. But as I'm quick to say, I'm light on the jurisprudence here, to say the least.
- basman
July 14, 2012 at 2:08pm